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 Executive Summary 
 
A. The scope and objectives of the research 
 
This report examines innovations in pay and grading in 10 NHS trusts in England 
using data collected from March 2000 to January 2001, ie prior to the implementation 
of Agenda for Change.  These 10 trusts, which varied in size, function, and location, 
were selected primarily to illustrate a variety of different approaches to pay and 
grading. The research utilised a qualitative methodology, with interviews of managers 
on a one to one basis, group interviews with lay union representatives, focus groups 
with staff and the inspection of documents. This study focused on four questions: 
 
• Did local pay resolve the problems associated with Whitley? 
• What were the consequences of local pay? 
• Were the trusts’ pay systems introduced in line with 'new pay' ideas and current 
trends in reward management? 
• What factors were critical to the success of developing and implementing local 
pay systems in NHS trusts? 
 
 
B. Background 
 
The data on pay and grading in NHS trusts was placed in context by reviewing pay 
arrangements in the public services. In the civil service decentralised collective 
bargaining is well established with pay progression essentially based on performance; 
but the amount and form of performance rewards were being re-examined, with team 
bonuses being considered. In the universities an independent review (Bett, 1999) 
proposed wide ranging reforms to both bargaining structures and pay systems to 
address long- standing gender inequality issues but at the time of writing there had 
been little progress on the review’s recommendations. In local government a new 
national level ‘single status’ agreement was concluded in 1997. The agreement gives 
local authorities considerable discretion. For instance they can choose a job evaluation 
system and determine a range of premium payments, but there has been slow progress 
on implementation. 
 
To inform further our answers to the research questions, the report also reviewed the 
criticisms of Whitley and the debates and issues surrounding the choice and 
application of pay systems, in particular the 'new pay' and reward management 
literature. 
 
C. Findings 
 
Aims and objectives 
 
Management aims could be categorised as value driven or issue driven. The former 
included such objectives as fairness, simplicity, equity and enhanced patient care. The 
latter included recruitment and retention issues. Trusts adopted a values based, 
strategic approach where they were proposing to introduce pay changes for a 
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significant proportion of their workforce throughout the organisation. Conversely, 
where trusts were proposing to introduce pay changes for a discrete area only, issues 
driven approaches were adopted. The need to manage performance was often not an 
espoused aim, but interviewees suggested that it formed at least part of the rationale 
for pay changes. 
 
Pay systems 
 
The extent to which trust employees were eligible for local pay systems varied. At one 
trust none were eligible as the trust adhered to the national arrangements. On the other 
hand in three trusts all non-medical staff were eligible and in the remaining trusts 
discrete occupational groups only were eligible for the new arrangements. Take-up 
rates among eligible staff also varied, from 25% to virtually 100%. 
 
Four out of our 10 trusts used Medequate job evaluation, one trust used Hay and 
another introduced ‘recruitment clusters’ based on a competency grading system. The 
remaining trusts based their new grading systems on the national grading system with 
changes to suit their circumstances. Three of the trusts using job evaluation adopted 
single pay spines, which managers saw as enhancing teamwork and providing a 
defence against equal value claims. Only one trust introduced a very broad banded 
structure with no pay maxima to grades, only pay minima. Most trusts which 
introduced their own pay systems ended up with grading structures which were little 
different from the national grading structures either in theory or in practice. 
 
Basic pay apart, four of our trusts did not move away from the national terms and 
conditions. Turning to those that did, significant features were the incorporation of 
unsocial hours premia into basic pay and harmonisation of unsocial hours premia, 
overtime, working hours (37.5 per week) and on call payments. Of all the major 
conditions annual leave was the least likely to be harmonised, essentially for 
pragmatic reasons, ie the costs involved in harmonisation. 
 
Pay progression 
 
Performance related payments were made for at least some staff in nine of our 10 case 
study trusts but only in one was performance related to the organisation as a whole.  
In all the other trusts, performance related to the individual but there was variation as 
to whether the individual's performance was measured by behavioural and/or clinical 
attributes, with some trusts developing competencies. As to how the payments were 
made, the majority of trusts made payments on an incremental, consolidated basis. 
Two trusts employed a mixture of consolidated and non-consolidated increases and 
one trust gave non-consolidated bonuses only to staff at the top of their grade, with 
service related increments within grade. 
 
There was a wide variation in the extent to which trusts’ performance pay systems 
discriminated between employees' performance. For example, at one end of the 
spectrum nurses and midwives at one trust could receive 10 possible levels of award 
ranging from 0 to 6%. Within the spectrum, in three trusts a performance award was 
withheld from around 10% of employees. At the other end of the spectrum, in three 
trusts the performance award, equating to a service related increment under Whitley, 
was not normally withheld. 
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Process 
 
The unions did not favour any departure from national pay arrangements. Given that 
general stance they adopted three main approaches: in five trusts there were 
management/union agreements on the new pay system and negotiations and 
agreement each year on the annual review; at three trusts there were 
management/union discussions prior to the introduction of a new pay system, but not 
agreement, though subsequently there were negotiations and agreement on the annual 
increase; at two trusts there was no discussion before the introduction of a new pay 
system, but subsequently there were negotiations and agreement on the annual 
increase. As to staffs' views, five trusts held focus groups of staff to elicit views about 
the future shape of a pay system or to help to compile competencies. 
  
Costs 
 
Management time in developing a pay system was hard to quantify, especially where 
managers incorporated pay development and implementation into their other duties. 
Three trusts, however, introduced a new full-time post. Assimilation costs ranged 
from nil to 3.5% of the paybill and depended on a number of factors, including the 
extent to which the new pay system differed from national arrangements and whether 
the trust, wishing for a high take-up rate initially, offered generous incentives to 
transferring staff.  
 
Outcomes 
 
Our data revealed that eight of the 10 case study trusts took the opportunity of 
changes to pay systems to introduce rotating shifts, new on-call arrangements or 
annual hours. Managers were of the view that such new working patterns, 
underpinned by revised payment systems, enabled them to meet service needs more 
effectively. The main area where the pay system was used to support multi-skilling 
was in theatres. ODPs/ODAs and theatre nurses were placed on a new and common 
pay system (instead of two separate sets of national arrangements) and at the same 
time were trained to provide functional flexibility. 
 
There was a paucity of evaluation conducted by trusts. Where evaluation took place it 
was often small in scale, eg evaluation of a pilot. Moreover, although trusts collect 
data on labour turnover and sickness absence and now carry out an annual staff 
attitude survey, none compared those on the national arrangements with those on the 
trust’s pay system. This limited the usefulness of such data for the purposes of this 
study. 
 
With this important caveat, we examined labour turnover data. It did not indicate that 
new pay systems had had any noticeable positive or negative long-term effects. The 
sickness data examined, however, indicated that the introduction of a new pay system 
had, in a few trusts, gone hand in hand with a reduction in sickness absence, though 
this did not necessarily equate to a causal link. 
 
As to patient outcomes, the link between pay systems and three NHS performance 
indicators (emergency re-admissions, deaths within 30 days of surgery after 
emergency and non-emergency admissions) were explored but no clear relationship 
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was found. Many management interviewees, however, and some staff, were strongly 
of the view that their new pay systems had led to an improvement in patient care. 
  
D. Conclusions 
 
Our literature review indicated that managers identified three problematic areas in 
Whitley: the Whitley Council structure, the complexity of the numerous collective 
agreements and the high degree of centralisation. Another problem, equal value, was 
revealed in the litigation stemming from Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority 
(1993).  
 
Our data showed that where the case study trusts made innovations in pay and grading 
the bargaining structure was greatly simplified both on the management side and the 
union side. Also, in a number of trusts collective agreements were simplified. Other 
trusts, however, introduced a number of pay systems for different occupational 
categories and/or departments in the trust and this resulted in considerable 
complexity, compounded in one case by a merger. Another source of complexity was 
the pay progression arrangements. Eight out of the 10 trusts studied had replaced 
service related increments with performance based pay progression arrangements. As 
to centralisation, interestingly only in three trusts were the majority of employees 
covered by pay arrangements which materially differed from the national 
arrangements. This suggested that managers on the whole did not necessarily make 
use of the pay flexibility provided to them. Moreover, only three trusts introduced job 
evaluated single pay spines which could obviate equal value problems for employees 
in the same employment. 
 
We also examined the consequences of local pay. On the one hand, interviewees 
highlighted benefits for the service, especially where new pay arrangements supported 
changes in working hours and/or multi-skilling. On the other hand, local pay 
arrangements were not unproblematic. Where the new pay system included an opaque 
system of performance related pay which made fine distinctions between staff there 
was both union hostility and staff dissatisfaction.  
 
The 'new pay' and reward management writers recommend a strategic approach to 
pay, ie that there should be a link between pay and business strategy. Our data, 
however, indicated that only four of our 10 trusts adopted a strategic approach, while 
a further three trusts planned to take an organisation-wide approach but in the event 
did not do so. The 'new pay' writers also recommend that pay be based on the 
individual (for example, by performance pay), rather than a rate for the job. Nine out 
of our 10 case study trusts introduced at least an element of performance related pay, 
though the rhetoric of performance pay was not always translated into reality and only 
in one trust was the annual increase entirely based on performance.  
 
As to grading structures, our data contrasted with the views of American 'new pay' 
writers that job evaluation is in decline and that broad banding is on the increase. Five 
trusts used job evaluation and there was only limited evidence of broad banding. An 
area where our data accorded with current trends in reward management, however, 
was harmonisation, with single pay spines in three trusts and harmonisation in respect 
of terms and conditions, apart from pay, in six out of the 10 case study trusts. We also 
found examples of trusts introducing variability in the weekly amount or timing of 
employees’ hours, while keeping constant employees’ pay. 
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Finally, factors critical to the success of developing and implementing new pay 
systems were considered and the following conclusions were drawn from our data:  
 
• A close working relationship between management and the staff side at trust level 
eased the development and introduction of local pay regimes. 
 
• Trust managers said that the process of introducing a new pay system was more 
time consuming than they had anticipated and three trusts created new full-time 
posts to develop and implement local pay regimes.  
 
• Liaison with employees, for instance on assimilation arrangements and the 
drawing up of competencies, engendered the confidence of staff and unions who 
mistrusted complex and opaque performance pay systems. 
 
• Harmonisation of terms and conditions, as well as being perceived by 
management, unions and staff as equitable, also contributed to improvements in 
functional flexibility and teamworking. 
 
• Management considered that the subsuming of certain premium payments into 
basic pay served to underpin temporal flexibility and staff welcomed the ensuing 
stability in earnings.  
 
• Our focus groups of staff were of the view that pay systems must be considered 
alongside a number of other factors, particularly career development arrangements 
and pay levels.
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OVERVIEW 
 
This report focuses on innovations in pay and grading in 10 NHS trusts in England 
prior to the implementation of Agenda for Change. Our approach utilised a case study 
methodology.  The research questions (stemming from our original proposal, see 
Appendix A) were: 
 
• Did local pay resolve the problems associated with Whitley? 
 
• What were the consequences of local pay? 
 
• Were the trusts’ pay systems introduced in line with 'new pay' ideas and current 
trends in reward management? 
 
• What factors were critical to the success of developing and implementing local 
pay systems in NHS trusts? 
 
This report is organised in two parts. Part one reports the background literature, 
placing our data in context by reviewing the state of play in the public services and 
specifically local government and the NHS.  The literature review also addresses the 
debates and issues surrounding the choice and application of pay structures. These 
served to prompt our research questions.  Part two provides an account of our 
empirical work.  Analyses are organised around several key issues, including trust 
aims and objectives, pay systems, pay progression arrangements, the process of 
developing and implementing trust pay and outcomes.  We end by drawing together 
our findings and the current literature, presenting key conclusions and pointing to 
critical success factors. 
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PART ONE: THE LITERATURE 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades there have been major changes in the way in which 
employees’ pay and grading is determined in the UK.  These developments have been 
driven by both economic and political changes and have affected the private and 
public sectors. In this literature review we provide a context for our research on 
innovations in pay and grading in the NHS.  The review is organised into sections.  In 
section 1.2 we examine changes in public sector pay generally. In sections 1.3 and 1.4 
we take a detailed look at local government and the NHS respectively. In section 1.5 
we consider the theoretical debates and issues in what has become increasingly known 
as reward management.  
1.2 Pay in the public services: the context 
1.2.1 The Conservative years 1979-1997 
The Conservative government elected in 1979 was in power for a substantial enough 
period to have had a significant effect upon employment policies in a way that few 
post-war governments have had.  Essentially in 1979 it abandoned the use of incomes 
policies to control wage and price inflation in favour of a market approach. For 
instance, Mr Kenneth Clarke, when Minister of State for Employment, said in 1987: 
 
We must move towards a system more clearly based on market forces, on demand and supply, 
on competition and on ability to pay… If we can move to a system where pay increases are 
primarily based on performance, merit, company profitability and demand and supply in the 
local labour market, we will dethrone once and for all the annual pay round and the belief that 
pay increases do not have to be earned (cited in Kessler and Bayliss, 1998:223). 
 
The Conservative government, as the direct or indirect employer, was able to 
influence the pay arrangements for public sector workers in line with this approach.  
For instance, it gradually introduced performance related pay into the civil service and 
for senior managers in the NHS in the 1980s. Then in the 1990s performance related 
pay became a feature in the bespoke pay systems developed by some NHS trusts and 
in a significant number of local authorities, at least for senior managers. It also 
replaced collective bargaining for certain public sector workers with determination by 
pay review bodies: nurses and professions allied to medicine in the NHS and school 
teachers in England and Wales (White, 2000). The coverage of the Senior Salaries 
Review Body was also extended to cover grade 5 civil servants (Cabinet Office, 
1994). 
 
Furthermore, from 1996 the Conservative government replaced national pay 
determination for all civil servants (except the most senior) with department/agency 
pay determination in an attempt to ensure that pay rates more accurately reflected 
specific labour market needs rather than the many and often conflicting needs of the 
civil service as a whole (Cabinet Office, 1994; Corby, 1998). Similarly it encouraged 
local bargaining in the NHS in 1995-96 in an attempt to ensure that pay reflected local 
labour market conditions (Corby, 1996). In addition, especially in the tight labour 
market generated by the economic boom of the late 1980s, it reacted to labour market 
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pressures by awarding special pay additions to public sector workers in short supply, 
rather than increasing pay more generally (White, 1996). 
 
The economic downturn of the early 1990s led the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Kenneth Clarke, to impose a pay limit of 1.5 % in the public sector, followed by a 
freeze on pay budgets for the subsequent three years. Under this pay policy any 
increases for public sector workers had to be funded through efficiency or other 
savings (IDS, 1993).  
1.2.2 New Labour 1997-2001 
Initially New Labour continued with its predecessor’s public sector pay policy. It 
sought to ensure that all pay increases in the public services were self-financing. In 
1998, the first year in which the new government considered the recommendations of 
the pay review bodies, the awards were accepted but staged, reducing the overall cost. 
In the subsequent three years, however, it implemented in full the pay review body 
recommendations.  
 
Over the period from January 1998 to September 2000 public sector earnings, as 
measured by the monthly Average Earnings Index, continued to run below the level in 
the private sector.  A more reliable measure, the annual New Earnings Survey, 
indicates that average weekly earnings in the public sector stood at £394.40, 
compared to £412.30 in the private sector in April 2000 (ONS, 2000).  Pay dispersion 
is much narrower in the public sector than in the private with lowest decile workers 
having higher pay in the public than the private sector. In contrast, highest decile 
workers have higher pay in the private sector than in the public sector. 
 
The government, in its white paper Modernising Government (Cabinet Office, 1999a), 
laid down its main political objectives for the public services. In respect of public 
sector employees, it undertook to revise performance management arrangements and 
tackle the under-representation of women, ethnic minorities and people with 
disabilities. Also, the government, in contrast to its predecessor, said that ‘we will 
continue to work closely with the public sector trade unions to achieve our shared 
goals of committed, fair, efficient and effective public services’ (Cabinet Office, 
1999a: 62). In addition it said: ‘Public servants must be rewarded fairly for the 
contribution they make. We must make sure that our approach to pay encourages 
more of the best people to join and stay’ (Cabinet Office 1999a:58).  The government 
then listed four ways in which this objective could be achieved: 
 
• the reform of ‘outdated’ systems, including challenging the ‘idea that “fair pay” 
means that everybody should get the same increase, or that pay and conditions 
should all be set nationally’; 
 
• revising pay scales and grading systems to deal with recruitment and retention 
problems for certain key groups of staff such as teachers and nurses so that ‘more 
skilled people can stay in the front line’; 
 
• making best use of non-pay incentives, for example better training and 
development opportunities, good career prospects, family friendly policies and 
employee recognition schemes; 
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• rewarding results and performance. ‘A person’s pay should reflect their output, 
results and performance… We should challenge systems which give automatic 
pay increases to poor or inefficient performers'; 
 
(Cabinet Office 1999a: 59). 
1.2.3 School teachers 
This overarching policy was translated somewhat differently in each public service, in 
part according to its history and political salience. An example of New Labour’s 
objective of rewarding results and performance and its objective of revising pay scales 
to deal with recruitment and retention problems of key staff can be found in the 
proposals for individual performance-related pay for school teachers.  The 
government proposed a new nine point scale for classroom teachers based on annual 
increments with a performance threshold which would trigger an immediate £2,000 
increase with a further five performance-related pay points on top of the nine point 
scale.  Teachers with management or other additional responsibilities would receive 
special allowances (Department for Education and Employment, 1998). 
 
The additional increments were to be paid from September 2000 but the government’s 
plans were temporarily thrown into disarray in July 2000, when the National Union of 
Teachers successfully challenged the performance scheme in the courts. This is 
because, unlike other UK public servants, any changes to the pay of school teachers in 
England and Wales must be approved by Parliament but this had not been done. 
Subsequently the Secretary of State asked the pay review body to consider the 
performance pay scheme, which then went ahead with additional government funding  
(Department for Education and Employment, 2000). 
1.2.4 Civil Service 
The Conservative government, as noted above (see sub-section 1.2.1), had made 
significant changes to civil service pay, introducing individual performance related 
pay and replacing national level bargaining with bargaining by department/executive 
agency. Thus Labour’s espoused policies of rewarding performance, reforming 
‘outdated’ systems and revising pay scales to deal with recruitment and retention 
problems would seem already to have been realised. Problems, however, remained, 
mainly centred on pay progression arrangements. The Cabinet Office has recognised 
the fact that in many departments and agencies the size of the performance-related pay 
increase is insufficient to motivate staff (IDS, 2000:35). It said: 
 
Performance related pay needs to take its place in a culture of proactive management. We need 
to be clearer about what we actually want from performance related pay and how that can be 
achieved within the financial constraints which will continue to exist’ (Cabinet Office 
1999b:13).  
 
As a result, departments and agencies are reviewing their performance management 
structures, with a view to introducing new pay and appraisal systems from April 2001. 
 
A parallel review of civil service performance pay was undertaken by the Public 
Services Productivity Panel in the Treasury, led by John Makinson, Group Finance 
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Director of Pearson plc. It looked at four major civil service departments and 
proposed that: 
 
• unconsolidated merit bonuses should replace the current consolidated performance 
increases,  
 
• performance should be measured against operational targets, rather than against 
individual appraisal results, and  
 
• team based bonuses, based on efficiency savings, should be used instead of 
individual performance pay for most civil servants,  
(Makinson, 2000). 
 
At the time of writing these proposals had yet to be accepted though one department 
(Customs & Excise) was conducting some pilots of team bonuses. 
 
1.2.5 Universities 
In the universities (which strictly are not part of the public sector) there are a number 
of pay related problems. First, since the transformation of the previously local 
government controlled polytechnics into ‘new’ universities in 1992, there has been a 
single system of higher education with one employers’ organisation but two sets of 
negotiations for ‘old’ and ‘new’ universities, each with their own settlement dates.  
Amalgamation of the two separate negotiating machineries has been long overdue. 
Second, there are continuing equal value problems (Bett, 1999). 
 
An independent review, chaired by Sir Michael Bett, recommended that higher 
education should retain a broad national framework for the determination of pay and 
conditions of service, but with freedom within the framework for individual 
institutions to adapt the detail (Bett, 1999). It also recommended that: 
 
• The present 10 separate negotiating groups (six bargaining groups in ‘old’ 
universities in England and Wales, three groups in ‘new’ universities in England 
and Wales and one group in Scottish universities) should be replaced by a single 
National Council with an independent chairperson and secretariat. 
 
• There should be two closely related pay spines: one for academics (teachers, 
research and academic related staff) and one for non-academic staff (ancillaries, 
administrative and technical staff), with a common settlement date for all groups. 
 
• Pay progression for academic staff should be based on length of service (up to 
four years), relevant qualifications, additional responsibilities, and merit and 
achievement. 
 
• Pay progression for non-academic staff should be based on merit and 
achievement, responsibilities and acquired competencies, as well as experience 
gained in the first few years of service in a grade. 
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• A new job evaluation scheme should be introduced to remedy gender inequalities 
for which funding by central government would be necessary. The committee 
estimated that the paybill increases necessary would be about 9% for academic 
staff and around 8% for non-academic staff. 
 
In February 2000, it was agreed in principle that three joint working parties should be 
established to deal with new national bargaining machinery, equal opportunities and 
casualisation (NATFHE, 2000:1). Following the ending of a dispute over the 2000 
pay awards in universities and as part of those settlements, it was agreed at the 
beginning of 2001 that the joint working party on equal opportunities should go ahead 
forthwith. 
  
The so-called Russell Group of elite universities, however, that hope to create a 
British ‘Ivy League’, have made it clear that they wish to make pay and conditions 
much more dependent on market principles. They want lecturers’ salaries and 
conditions to be priced according to scarcity, performance and demand. The 
government, as part of an injection of money into higher education, has asked all 
universities to devise pay schemes, essentially in accordance with the Russell Group 
approach, for consideration by the Higher Education Funding Council (Kelly, 2000). 
Whether national level bargaining can withstand these pressures is an open question. 
1.3 Local government 
1.3.1 Background 
While the NHS has not yet agreed a new pay structure, local government did so with 
effect from 1997. Local government in England and Wales employs 1.2 million 
people (excluding teachers) and has a paybill of £13 billion1. There are 410 local 
authorities each employing from a few hundred staff to tens of thousands (White and 
Hutchinson, 1996). These differences in size reflect geographical size to some extent, 
but also the range of services provided. The largest employers are the large 
metropolitan city authorities and the London boroughs, followed by the county 
councils and unitary councils. The district councils, while most numerous, are the 
smallest, as they employ relatively few occupational groups.  
 
Local government is funded both by central government grants (which provide around 
80% of the total) and by its own revenue, raised through the council tax. It, therefore, 
has a degree of financial independence and a wide scope in employment matters 
compared to central government. Most local authorities, however, since the Second 
World War, have followed the various national agreements on pay and conditions. In 
the 1980s a small number of local authorities, largely small district councils, opted out 
of the national agreements to establish their own terms and conditions (Griffiths, 
1990; Bryson et al, 1993) at least for some of their staff. In many cases these opted 
out councils used the opportunity to introduce performance related pay schemes and 
new job evaluation systems (IDS/KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock, 1988; 
IDS/Coopers and Lybrand, 1989). 
 
                                                 
1 Information provided by a press officer in the Employers’ Organisation, January 2001. 
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The 1997 agreement was not the first major new deal in local government in recent 
years. In 1987 the local government employers and the unions representing manual 
workers concluded an agreement. The job evaluation (JE) exercise, conducted by a 
joint management/union team, led to the creation of a new six grade structure for 
manual workers (IDS, 1987). Certain ‘plus rates’ paid for particular duties were also 
consolidated. The national job evaluation scheme adopted was points-based, with 
eight weighted factors, which allowed each job to be evaluated at local council level. 
A key concern was equal value and the JE scheme’s factors covered all aspects of 
manual workers’ tasks, not just the traditional factors of educational/training 
attainments and strength (IDS, 1987; IRS, 1987; Hastings, 2000). Accordingly, it 
resulted in the moving of some female jobs to higher grades.  
 
The agreement, however, whilst it dealt with basic pay rates, did not tackle the fact 
that male manual workers typically receive bonuses and female manual workers, eg 
cooks, do not. According to a survey of manual workers’ pay by the local government 
employers in 1996, 57% of men received bonus payments compared to only 7% of 
women (cited in IDS, 1999:91). The 1987 agreement also included a commitment in 
the longer term to harmonisation with white collar staff. The creation of the trade 
union, Unison, in 1993 (Certification Officer, 1994), which brought together both 
manual and non-manual local government employees, gave added impetus to this 
commitment. 
1.3.2 The 1997 agreement 
The 1987 agreement was superseded by the 1997 so-called single status agreement, 
which brought together the two largest bargaining groups, the manual workers’ 
national joint council (NJC) and the administrative professional, technical and clerical 
(APT &C) NJC, establishing a single pay spine and harmonising working hours. The 
culmination of several years of negotiations, the agreement maintains a national 
framework for pay determination but in response to employer demands, allows more 
local flexibility than hitherto at individual council level.  The agreement, however, 
does not cover a number of small bargaining groups such as chief executives, chief 
officers and various specialist education groups and maintenance crafts, who retain 
their own agreements.  
 
The major objectives of the new pay system are threefold: to address a longstanding 
issue of fairness or ‘equity’ between the terms and conditions of manual and non-
manual workers; to address problems of equal value, especially in bonus schemes; and 
to allow employers more local flexibility in grading, pay progression systems and 
terms and conditions (IDS, 1998). The agreement provides for: 
 
• the creation of a single integrated 49 point pay spine for both manual and non-
manual employees, 
 
• a standard 37 hour week for all employees from 1 April 1999, 
 
• a new national job evaluation scheme with the encouragement of local grading 
reviews, 
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• the ability to modify certain conditions of service by local negotiation, 
(particularly unsocial hours premia),  
 
• the ability to grade staff on a single point or a scale, 
 
• the ending of subsistence allowances, 
 
• the ability to average hours over a longer period than a week, 
 
• the handling of grading appeals locally rather than at provincial level as before, 
and 
 
• clearer provisions on the suspension of sick pay, 
 (National Joint Council, 1997). 
 
1.3.3 Reasons for slow progress 
Progress with implementation of the local authority agreement has been slow for four 
main reasons: structure, local flexibility, cost and management/union relations. 
Dealing first with structure, local authorities have a degree of independence, as noted 
in sub-section 1.3.1. They come together voluntarily and do not have to follow the 
national agreements, though most do so, and were able to use the national pay spine 
flexibly before the 1997 agreement (IDS/KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock, 1988). 
There is a national employers’ organisation and provincial councils but, unlike the 
NHS, there is no direct involvement in national negotiations by central government 
(White and Hutchinson, 1996). As a result, there is no hierarchical structure to ensure 
implementation locally. 
 
As to local flexibility, councils have considerable choice within the national 
agreement. For example they are free to choose either the bespoke National Joint 
Council (NJC) JE scheme or some other scheme.  The unions favour the use of the 
NJC scheme but some councils have chosen to use Hay, the Greater London 
Employers’ scheme or some other patented scheme. In some cases councils, which 
had opted out of the national agreement prior to 1997, had already adopted new JE 
schemes. Councils are also free to design their own grading systems, although they 
‘must be fair and non-discriminatory, complying with equal pay legislation and 
associated Codes of Practice’ (National Joint Council, 1997: 2.3). This allows the 
number of grades to differ from council to council, unlike the previous recommended 
national grades (IRS, 1998b).  
 
Although by 1999 more than 110 councils had agreed to use the new NJC scheme, 
(out of 191 that had decided on a JE scheme), only a handful had actually begun the 
process of evaluation and even fewer had completed it (Employers’ Organisation, 
1999). A year later, progress continued to be slow. An IRS survey of 98 councils, 
employing 58% of the 1.2 million employees covered by the agreement, found that by 
July 2000 only seven respondents (six district councils and one county council) had 
carried out job evaluation and put a new harmonised pay structure in place. The 
survey also found, however, that 71% said that they had decided on which job 
evaluation scheme to use (IRS, 2000). At the time of writing not a single large 
 8
metropolitan authority had completed the exercise. Small district councils have made 
most progress, essentially because they employ few manual workers and relatively 
few occupational categories, so harmonisation is simpler. One large council which has 
completed the introduction of the NJC job evaluation scheme is West Sussex County 
Council, which implemented a 12-grade structure. A major impetus in that local 
authority was the outcome of an equal value case.  
 
Another key area where there is flexibility relates to terms and conditions outwith 
pay. The national agreement provides for local negotiation over the unresolved issues 
of shift payments, unsocial hours payments, most standby allowances and the bonus 
scheme for manual workers (IDS,1998:83). The only national conditions remaining 
are sick pay and car allowances, although the NJC continues to set working time 
premia (eg overtime and shift allowances for those who have not adopted local 
conditions). Local authorities, charged with resolving such important issues locally, 
have not been able to implement the new pay system easily or quickly. 
 
The third reason for slow progress relates to cost. As discussed in sub-section 1.3.1 
local government finance comes from both central government grants and the local 
authority’s council tax. There is no specific allocation of central government funds for 
pay costs and councils set their own staffing levels and pay budgets. This means that 
councils have to meet any costs of the new agreement from their own budgets. The 
agreement provided for the harmonisation of working hours at 37 hours per week and 
this has involved a two hour reduction for manual workers. The IRS survey found that 
85% of respondents had introduced a 37 hour week for manual workers, although this 
does not necessarily imply parity with non-manual workers in all cases (IRS 2000). 
(In some London authorities white-collar staff are already on 36 or 35 hours per 
week.) There are also costs connected with the consolidation of pay additions into 
basic salaries because employees normally expect some financial gain for accepting 
this change.   
 
The IRS survey found that a number of allowances had been changed by respondents, 
including subsistence allowances (57%); weekend rates (47%); mileage allowances 
(43%); overtime rates (42%); and evening rates (40%).  Annualised hours systems had 
been introduced by 26% of respondents. Consolidation or the reduction/abolition of 
allowances is one way in which employers can make savings, but there are on-going 
costs of protection for staff who are downgraded. There are also significant 
transaction costs. Some councils have established dedicated ‘single status’ teams 
employing specialist temporary contract staff (such as Birmingham and Newcastle 
City Councils), but elsewhere councils are trying to cope with existing HR staff. One 
way of containing costs might be the piecemeal approach taken by Newcastle City 
Council. It plans to have the NJC job evaluation scheme in place for the six existing 
manual grades and the three lowest APT&C grades by the end of 2001, with the 
higher grades joining later. The single status agreement was to be cost neutral, but at 
West Sussex County Council, for example, the changes totalled £5 million spread 
over a six year period (IRS, 2000:11). The unions are lobbying the government to 
provide councils with extra funding to help implement the agreement. 
 
The fourth reason for the slow progress relates to management/union relations. 
Although the agreement was the result of close working and partnership between 
employers and unions nationally, according to anecdotal reports the same partnership 
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has not been in evidence in some local authorities and this has slowed negotiations 
down. The national agreement exacerbates this because it provides for much of the 
detail of the new terms and conditions (and often the most contentious items) to be 
determined locally and this appears to be a major stumbling block. IRS reported a 
number of industrial disputes in local councils resulting from the agreement (IRS, 
2000:6). 
  
Lack of progress in implementation apart, the objective of addressing equal value 
problems and giving local authorities greater control over pay may conflict. There has 
been reluctance at a local level to tackle the issue of gender discrimination in bonus 
schemes. Furthermore, variation in the job evaluation systems selected by local 
authorities may give rise to equal value problems. Under the Equal Pay Act 
employees can only make comparisons with others in the same employment (or in 
associated companies in the private sector). The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), 
however, scrutinising the European Directive from which the national provisions 
stem, held in the case of Scullard v Knowles (1996) that in the public sector such 
comparisons may go wider. Scullard, employed by a government funded regional 
education advisory council, successfully compared herself to male managers 
employed by other regional advisory councils. It was held that she could make such a 
comparison.  The units were supported and funded by the Training and Education 
Directorate of what is now the Department for Education and Employment and thus 
were in the ‘same service’. 
 
Similarly in South Ayrshire Council v Morton (2001) the EAT ruled that EU equal 
pay law allowed a teacher employed by one Scottish local authority to nominate as a 
comparator a teacher employed by a different authority. Even though each local 
authority decided how salary scales agreed by the Scottish Joint Negotiating Council 
were to be implemented, there was ‘sufficient connection in a loose and non-technical 
sense’. Accordingly the applicant and the nominated comparator could be said to be in 
the same service even though the applicant’s employer had no control over the terms 
and conditions of employment of the comparator employed by another local authority. 
Although it has not yet been tested whether or not local government is a service under 
the equal pay provisions in respect of employees other than teachers, the cases cited 
above suggest that an employee of one local authority could compare herself with 
employees in another local authority 
1.3.4 Implications for the NHS 
The 1997 single status agreement was a major achievement in terms of meeting the 
requirements of the employers and trade unions. By combining the twin aims of a 
fairer pay system and local flexibility in pay, grading and allowances, the agreement 
provides a useful model of pay modernisation in the public services. Its 
implementation, however, has been much slower than anticipated, largely because of 
the costs of introduction and, in some cases, the inability to reach agreement locally 
on matters left to local negotiation. 
 
The 1997 agreement is primarily about the harmonisation of just two (albeit major) 
bargaining groups for manual and non-manual workers. It does not cover all the 
groups of local government staff, nor does it require the harmonisation of terms and 
conditions for differing professional and technical groups. The major remaining group 
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of local government employees, school teachers, continues to be covered separately 
by a pay review body and there is no pay linkage with NJC staff. Thus the local 
government agreement differs from the proposals in Agenda for Change (Department 
of Health, 1999), which envisage the harmonisation of the many professional and 
technical NHS occupations. Another difference is that local government employers 
come together voluntarily but in the NHS, there is a hierarchical system with a chain 
of command running from the Department of Health and the NHS Executive at the 
apex, through regional directors to NHS trusts.  
 
1.4 The National Health Service 
1.4.1 Background 
The National Health Service (NHS), essentially funded by central government out of 
general taxation, currently receives some £54.2 billion2. Of this 70% is spent on the 
costs of employing its nearly one million staff in England (782,000 whole time 
equivalents) of whom in 1999 68% were direct care staff and 32% were management 
and support staff. 
 
 
Table 1.1: NHS  Hospital and Community Services: directly employed staff3
 
30 September, 1999; England: Whole-time equivalent (thousands) 
 
Staff group 1989 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
All directly employed staff 797.3 758.5 755.6 761.3 758.1 765.9 782.1 
All direct care staff ------- ------ 497.3 507.9 508.3 517.3 529.3 
Nursing, midwifery, health 
visiting staff 
------- ------ 330.4 332.7 330.6 332.2 338.6 
          of which qualified staff ------- ------ 246.8 248.1 246.0 247.2 250.7 
Medical & dental staff 44.1 49.4 52.6 54.2 57.1 58.7 60.3 
Other direct care staff ------ ----- 111.6 118.5 120.6 126.4 130.4 
All management & support 
staff 
------ ----- 260.9 255.9 249.7 248.6 252.8 
Admin. & estates staff ------ ------ 168.7 167.4 167.0 167.7 172.8 
Other management & support 
staff 
------ ------ 92.2 88.4 82.8 80.9 80.0 
 
The directly employed NHS workforce is predominantly female (76%), although the 
proportion is smaller for some staff groups, eg 34% for medical and dental staff, 
according to Department of Health Statistics. The numbers of non-professional groups 
have varied over the last two decades. In particular, the number of ancillaries has 
more than halved since 1983, reflecting the then government’s requirement for 
competitive tendering for laundry, cleaning and catering services. Some contracts 
                                                 
2 UK net NHS Expenditure Plan 2000/2001. 
3 www.doh.gov.uk/HPSSS/TBL-D1.HTM accessed 5/3/01 
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went outside the NHS but, even where in-house tenders were successful, this was 
often because hours and jobs were cut (Mailly et al, 1989). Seifert (1992) estimates 
that 82% of tenders were won in-house. 
 
A distinction can be made between those staff in a labour market which is external, eg 
building and maintenance craftsmen, secretaries and those whose labour market is 
internal eg doctors and qualified nurses. Even where the labour market is largely 
internal, however, health care staff can work in private healthcare, as well as for the 
NHS and/or for an agency. Hendry (1995) distinguishes further with a four-part 
typology: internal labour market, occupational labour market, technical and industrial 
labour market and external labour market. An internal labour market is where ports of 
entry are restricted, eg the civil service, so the majority of NHS staff according to 
Hendry’s typology would fall within the category of an occupational labour market. 
This, he says, is where the ‘benefits of training accrue to the individual, and their first 
loyalty is often said to be to the craft, occupation or profession, rather than to the 
organisation’ (1995:232). Irrespective of the typology used, however, the different 
labour market contexts for the various NHS job ‘families’ create tensions at trust 
level. 
 
1.4.2 The Whitley system 
When the NHS was established in 1948 it adopted the so-called Whitley industrial 
relations system, which was in use in the civil service and local government 
(Winchester and Bach, 1995). The system stemmed from a report of a committee 
chaired by J. S. Whitley in 1916 which recommended the establishment of joint 
industrial councils with formal written constitutions and joint determination over a 
wide range of matters or, to use today’s terminology, a partnership approach (Clegg, 
1985:204-207). The NHS Whitley system was designed to: 
 
secure the greatest possible measure of co-operation between the authorities responsible for the 
nation’s health and the general body of persons engaged in the health services, with a view to 
increased efficiency in the public service, and the well-being of those engaged in the services… 
[and] to provide machinery for the consideration of remuneration and conditions of service 
(Main Constitution of the Whitley Councils for the Health Service (Great Britain) cited in 
Loveridge 1971: 147).  
 
At present there is a general Whitley Council for matters affecting all NHS staff and 
numerous functional councils and several committees4 as follows: 
 
Administrative and clerical staffs (including ambulance officers, control 
assistants), 
Ambulance staffs, 
Ancillary staffs,                                                                                                      
Professional & Technical A  (including radiographers, physiotherapists and 
occupational therapists),  
Scientific and Professional Staffs who have committees for: 
• speech therapists,  
• clinical psychologists, 
• clinical scientists, 
                                                 
4 Verbal communication from Department of Health, 31.1.01. 
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• hospital pharmacists,  
• chaplains,                                                                
Professional and Technical ‘B’  (medical laboratory scientific officers, medical 
technical officers, estates officers, operating department practitioners/assistants, 
dental staff),                                                                       
Doctors and dentists,                                                                                             
Nurses, midwives and health visitors. 
 
For building trades and maintenance staff there is a management advisory panel 
(MAP). Although not legally constituted as a Whitley Council, it operates in the same 
way as the functional councils cited above. 
 
This NHS Whitley system has essentially been unaltered since its inception, although 
there have been some changes (Seifert, 1992) as follows: 
 
• in 1962, when a pay review body was set up to recommend the fees, allowances 
and pay of doctors and dentists; 
 
• in 1974, when a new Whitley Council was created for ambulance staff (previously 
employed by local authorities); 
 
• in 1983 when a pay review body for nurses, midwives, health visitors and the 
professions allied to medicine was established to recommend pay and certain 
allowances but not other terms and conditions which remained to be determined 
under the Whitley system; 
 
• from 1990 when NHS trusts set up under the NHS and Community Care Act 
could determine the terms and conditions of their staff, subject to certain legal 
restrictions. 
 
 
Although the NHS Whitley system has not changed in any material respect since it 
was established, it has been heavily criticised for many decades. These criticisms 
centre on structure; complexity; over centralisation/ lack of local flexibility and equal 
value. They are now addressed in turn. 
1.4.3 Critiques: structure 
Dealing first with the Whitley council structure, Lord McCarthy described the system 
famously as ‘employers who do not pay and paymasters who do not employ’ 
(McCarthy, 1976: para 2.3) and highlighted the disproportionate influence of 
departmental civil servants upon negotiations. McCarthy's suggestion was that the 
civil servants should have control over the overall cost of pay offers but that the detail 
of the pay structures should be left to the NHS managers. 
 
Other recommendations for the reform of the Whitley Council structure were made by 
the TUC (1981), the National Association of Health Authorities (1983) and the King’s 
Fund (McCarthy, 1983). The last wanted the regional chairmen to appoint the chairs 
of the Whitley Councils to ensure accountability to the service and to be given the 
responsibility for formulating a strategy on NHS pay. 
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What resulted was the formation of a pay strategy sub-group by the RHA chairmen. 
The aim of the sub-group was to 
 
…. develop objectives for pay policies which reflect the manpower requirements of the NHS; 
future pay policy options and their consequences in anticipation of public expenditure sub-
committee discussions; [and] advise on strategy within which management sides have to operate 
(Leopold and Beaumont, 1986:39).   
 
In addition, the total number of Whitley Council management side members was cut 
from over 200 to less than 40 and management side members were henceforward 
appointed by the Health Secretary on the basis of their personal qualities, rather than 
as representatives. Leopold and Beaumont (1986) argued that these changes were 
designed to reduce the impact of intra-organisational bargaining, specifically between 
the department and NHS representatives and to increase the influence of NHS 
management over pay decisions and pay strategy.  Mailly et al (1989) argued that the 
overwhelming preponderance of NHS managers on the Whitley Councils appointed 
by the Health Secretary may have reduced intra-organisational bargaining between 
government and the NHS, but at the expense of an independent, truly representative 
management side. 
 
McCarthy also called for the rationalisation of representation on the staff side and for 
proportional representation for the unions, but this proved unpopular with the TUC 
unions, which could have lost seats to the professional bodies.  The number of unions 
represented on Whitley fell, however, from 48 in 1950 to 39 by 1989 (Mailly et al, 
1989:127). In the 1990s this process continued, notably with the amalgamation of the 
National Union of Public Employees, the Confederation of Health Service Employees 
and the National and Local Government Officers’ Association to form Unison in 1993 
(Certification Officer, 1994) and the transfers of engagements of the Health Visitors’ 
Association to MSF in 1990 (Certification Officer, 1991). Nevertheless, there are still 
over 20 unions represented on Whitley, over a dozen Whitley Councils/Committees 
and a very large management side. 
 
The intricate Whitley machinery is compounded by the fact that the two pay review 
bodies (for doctors/dentists and nurses and professions allied to medicine) set the pay 
of over half the staff working in the NHS, though their other terms and conditions are 
set by Whitley. As Seifert (1992:277) says:  
 
‘If Whitley was criticised for being remote and incomprehensible to ordinary health workers, 
so pay review is worse. If Whitley was criticised for the muddled role of government, so pay 
review is worse.’  
 
It is noteworthy that those occupations covered by pay review bodies have received 
larger increases than groups not covered by pay review bodies, according to Elliott 
and Duffus (1996) who looked at pay levels over the period 1970-1992. Although this 
report centres on pay structures, not pay levels, the former impacts on the latter. 
1.4.4 Critiques: complexity 
Some 15 years ago the King’s Fund/National Association of Health Authorities 
(1985) criticised the complexity of Whitley. It proposed that the Whitley Councils 
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should be wound up and three new bodies should be created: a pay policy committee 
to determine policy and negotiating strategy; a pay negotiation unit to brief the policy 
committee; and an NHS negotiation council to negotiate new pay bands.  There would 
be a ‘spinal column’ to which all NHS salaries would be attached, thus producing 
broad pay bands to enable the reward of merit and performance.  This suggested 
single spine, however, was rejected by almost all the NHS staff organisations. 
 
The Warlow report (1989:v), ‘the only comprehensive review [of NHS conditions of 
employment] to have taken place since the inception of the NHS', also criticised the 
complexity of Whitley. Based on interviews with over 600 NHS managers either 
individually or in small groups, it said: 
 
Other than the specialist (personnel officers), few managers are familiar with all of the 
provisions applying to their occupation and none appear conversant with many of the provisions 
applying to other occupations… They believe that most staff (again with the exception of the 
specialists and representatives) fare no better and often have a lesser understanding…The 
existence of 12 sets of agreements governing the employment conditions of NHS staff is 
complex – but 12 sets following no common structure, having different styles of authorship and 
sometimes using different terminology, compounds the managers’ problems of understanding 
(Warlow, 1989:36). 
 
The report called for the use of simpler wording, more uniform principles and a 
reduction in the scope of national regulation. 
1.4.5 Critiques: centralisation 
The reduction of the complexity of Whitley agreements thus interacts with another 
focus of criticism: the need for decentralisation. The tension between national and 
local pay determination has been a theme in the NHS for many a decade. On the one 
hand, the Department of Health and/or HM Treasury want to control public 
expenditure, and thus the pay of NHS employees, and to provide effective 
accountability through the Secretary of State to Parliament. On the other hand, local 
managers want flexibility to enable pay to be contingent on their service needs and to 
reflect local labour market conditions. Furthermore, ‘many doubt whether highly 
detailed, prescriptive, functionally based national agreements can cater for the degree 
of variety of local operational requirements’ (Warlow, 1989:3). 
 
The McCarthy report (1976) proposed that the Whitley Councils should negotiate 
more flexible agreements, allowing for wider interpretation and adaptation at regional 
level and below (Cuming 1978:193). Flexible elements in pay agreements could 
include starting salaries and allowances for differences in job content and 
performance elements.  Regional councils would be given the job of developing 
bargaining on all aspects of work arrangements and the distribution of work tasks, 
especially those having an impact upon pay such as overtime, shifts and leave rotas. 
 
Warlow (1989) considered that terms and conditions could be fashioned to local 
circumstances in one of three ways: by national agreements which allow wide local 
discretion in their application; by placing the onus for determining conditions on the 
district health authority; or by discriminating between these approaches according to 
the issue.  
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1.4.6 Equal value 
A criticism which came to the fore from the mid-1980s arises from the fact that, under 
the Whitley Council structure, terms and conditions are set for the different 
occupational groups separately. Some occupational groups are mainly female, eg 
speech and language therapists, and some are mainly male, eg clinical psychologists. 
An employer may satisfy the provisions of the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 
1983, by claiming that there is a material factor which gives rise to differences in pay 
between mainly male and mainly female groups. The European Court of Justice, 
however, in the leading case of Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority (1993) held that 
it would not be sufficient for an employer to rely on the absence of discrimination 
within each of the collective bargaining processes taken separately; nor to show that 
statistically significant pay differences between female dominated and male 
dominated jobs arose for non-discriminatory reasons. Where there is job segregation 
and a statistically significant difference in pay it is up to the employer to provide 
objective justification. A factor-based job evaluation scheme may provide such a 
justification, but there is none to date for the NHS as a whole, though there are in 
some trusts. Under the Equal Pay Act an employee can only make comparisons with 
others in the same employment (or with employees in associated companies in the 
private sector). The rulings in Scullard  (1996) and South Ayrshire Council (2001), 
however, which are based on EU law, suggest that an employee in one trust might be 
able to nominate as a comparator an employee in another trust (see sub-section 1.3.3). 
In other words, it is strongly arguable that comparisons could be made across the 
service; but this point has not yet been tested in respect of the NHS. 
1.4.7 The internal market and devolved bargaining 
The National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, which created self 
governing NHS trusts from hospitals run by the district health authorities, provided 
the opportunity to resolve some of the problems which had been identified with 
Whitley (Department of Health, 1990). Empowered to set the terms and conditions of 
employees, trust management would no longer be bound by the Whitley Council 
structure, could simplify agreements and mould their arrangements to suit their 
situation.  To foster devolved pay determination, the NHS Executive ‘pump-primed’ 
certain trust pay initiatives. 
 
The development of trust pay, though, was slow and in 1994 the government, losing 
patience with the slow pace of change, sought to impose local bargaining on trusts by 
requiring them to negotiate top-ups to the basic national awards. Thus there were 
national level enabling agreements concluded in 1994 for non-pay review body staff 
which allowed trusts to make local payments ‘based on the performance of the 
organisation’, although ‘agreement with staff and their trade unions and extensive 
communication with those affected are essential’ (Corby, 1996). Similarly the pay 
review body reports of 1995 for nurses, midwives and health visitors and the 
professions allied to medicine awarded 1% nationally with a further 0.5% to 2% to be 
awarded locally. This, however, sparked off an industrial dispute only resolved 
through a complex agreement. The agreement provided for local bargaining to top up 
the national pay awards but with an uprating mechanism though which the national 
pay rates would be adjusted annually to reflect the outcome of the previous year’s 
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local negotiations. In fact these complex provisions for local pay were only used in 
1995 and 1996. 
 
Moreover, a survey of 137 trusts in 1997 found that although more than three-quarters 
of the sample had developed local terms and conditions for trust staff, only 35 trusts 
had made extensive use of their freedom to set terms and conditions which differed in 
a majority of respects from Whitley (IRS, 1997). The reward components most likely 
to vary from national terms and conditions were annual leave; premium payments and 
enhancements; pay progression methods and sick pay. Bryson et al (1995:130) point 
out that, ‘in the long term the removal of complex premia and conditions diminishes 
the union role of joint regulation of the system as there is less opportunity for the 
unions to get involved’.  
 
In short, the government’s push to make trusts determine their own terms and 
conditions, thus breaking away from Whitley and reflecting their own needs and 
circumstances, including the local labour market, was only partially successful. A 
number of reasons have been suggested for this. First the law: a contract can only be 
varied by agreement, so under common law NHS employees can remain on the 
national arrangements provided they stay in the same job. Furthermore, there is 
statutory protection of an employee’s contractual rights under the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE) where an 
employee, who was employed by a health authority, has a new employer, the trust, 
provided the employee stays in the same job. Second, the continuance of the national 
pay arrangements (the Whitley system and the pay review bodies) had a 
countervailing effect to government policy (Carter and Fairbrother, 1999).  Third, 
pragmatic HR directors had more immediate priorities than introducing local pay 
(Corby and Higham, 1996). Fourth, HR directors who sought to reduce the cost of the 
paybill could more easily obtain such reductions by changes in working practices and 
skill mix changes rather than by devolved collective bargaining (Bach and 
Winchester, 1994; Lloyd and Seifert, 1995; Bach, 1998). Fifth, there were 
institutional obstacles arising from the tension between the centre and the field 
(Locock and Dopson, 1999) and union opposition (Lloyd, 1997; Thornley, 1998; 
Thornley et al, 2000), which restricted the development of local pay. 
1.4.8 Agenda for Change    
When there was a change of government in 1997, a full-blown local pay system had 
been developed in only a minority of NHS trusts and/or for small groups of staff. In 
February 1999 the Health Secretary announced new proposals in Agenda for Change 
(Department of Health, 1999). To provide a defence against equal value claims a new 
job evaluation scheme was proposed. To provide simplicity, there would be just three 
NHS bargaining groups with a national pay spine for each, with a considerable degree 
of harmonisation. To provide flexibility there would be some delegation to trusts on 
some matters.  At the time of writing, the relevant parties are in the throes of 
negotiating a new pay system for the NHS.  
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1.5 Debates and issues 
1.5.1 Reward management and 'new pay' 
The changes outlined above were accompanied by the development of a new 
paradigm in the UK, ‘reward management’. The term ‘reward management’ was first 
used by Armstrong and Murlis who define it as ‘the development, implementation, 
maintenance, communication and evaluation of reward processes’ (Armstrong and 
Murlis 1998:1), although Child had talked of ‘reward policies’ four years earlier 
(Child, 1984). While subtly different, there are close similarities between the British 
‘reward management’ paradigm and the American ‘new pay’ paradigm. For instance, 
both adopt a holistic approach to reward. 
1.5.2 Best fit or best practice? 
A major strand in both US 'new pay' and British reward management literature is the 
emphasis upon reward systems being contingent upon business strategy and explicitly 
linked to business performance, (Lawler, 1990, 1995; Mahoney, 1989; Schuster and 
Zingheim 1992).  For example, Lawler said: 
 
The new pay argues in favour of a pay-design process that starts with business strategy and 
organisational design. It argues against an assumption that certain best practices must be 
incorporated into a company’s approach to pay (Lawler, 1995:14). 
 
 Similarly, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin state: 
 
The emerging paradigm of the field is based on a strategic orientation where issues of internal 
equity and external equity are viewed as secondary to the firm’s need to use pay as an essential 
integrating and signalling mechanism to achieve overarching business objectives (Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992:4).  
 
This contingency approach can be contrasted with those who advocate a ‘best 
practice’ approach (Taylor, 2000). A number of writers argue that certain reward 
practices and ‘high commitment management’ can lead to improved performance, 
irrespective of business circumstances (Huselid, 1995; Fernie and Metcalf, 1996; 
Wood, 1996; Pfeffer, 1994 and 1998).   Also, there is considerable scepticism as to 
whether reward systems have become more linked to business strategy in practice 
(Smith, 1993; Poole and Jenkins, 1998).  A recent survey of senior managers’ views 
on new approaches to pay and reward found considerable support for the ideas 
expressed in the ‘new pay’ paradigm. There was considerably less evidence, however, 
of changes in practice (Poole and Jenkins, 1998), although there was a marked 
difference between the larger private sector companies and the rest. Whatever the 
practice, however, a contingency approach is scarcely new, as Kessler (2000:272) 
points out. It echoes the earlier, contingency based approach to pay design advocated 
by Lupton and Gowler (1969) or White (1981).   
1.5.3 Fixed or variable pay? 
Schuster and Zingheim (1992) argue that the traditional pay concepts of job evaluated 
grading structures, payment by time, seniority based pay progression and service-
related benefits are the product of Taylorist, manufacturing industries operating in 
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stable and predictable product market conditions. In the more volatile business 
environment of today, however, pay levels and composition need to fluctuate 
according to business circumstances; hence the emphasis upon variable pay as 
opposed to fixed pay and the individualisation of reward systems. In the words of a 
CBI report, the great attraction of variable pay is that pay ‘can go up and, crucially, 
down in line with individual, group and company performance’ (CBI/Wyatt 1994:5). 
 
According to the 'new pay' writers, employers must abandon concepts of ‘rate for the 
job’ in favour of those based on an individual employee’s value as measured in the 
external market.  Lawler (1990:153) argues: ‘Paying people according to their value 
in the market pays. After all, it is people who move from job to job and from company 
to company’. The use of internal comparisons for setting wages should be avoided, as 
it runs ‘the great risk of producing pay rates that are not competitive’ (Lawler 
1990:192). 
 
Also the proportion of fixed to variable pay should be increased to allow for more 
incentive pay based upon individual, group and/or organisational performance. As 
Heery (1996) indicates, this pay philosophy suggests a transfer of the organisation’s 
business risks from the employer to the employee.  
1.5.4 New forms of pay progression 
An important corollary of moves towards more person and incentive based 
remuneration systems has been the development of new criteria by which employees 
progress up a pay structure.  While payment by output, performance or productivity 
was common among manual workers in the past, there has been a substantial decline 
in payment by results (PBR) among this group in recent years (Druker, 2000).  In 
contrast, there has been a sharp increase in the numbers of non-manual workers who 
have all or part of their annual pay increase related to their performance.  The third 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) (Millward et al, 1992) found that 
between 30% and 40% of workplaces had merit pay for white-collar staff at various 
levels, compared to under 20% of workplaces with schemes for manual workers. A 
survey for the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (Cannell and Wood, 
1992) of 360 organisations found that a quarter of employers had introduced 
performance-related pay for non-manual workers over the previous five years, but 
only 6% had introduced such schemes for manual workers.  
 
There has been a substantial academic debate about the value of performance related 
or merit pay systems. This debate has largely been ignored by HR practitioners, who 
have continued to extol the benefits of such systems in the face of widespread 
evidence to the contrary (see for example Brown and Armstrong, 1999).  The 
underpinning theory for all performance related pay systems is expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968), the belief that employees will adjust their 
behaviour in line with the expected reward. Critics of individual performance related 
pay have focused on several aspects, not least the concept that pay is a motivator. The 
American critique of performance related pay goes back to the 1950s (Sayles, 1952; 
Whyte, 1955) but more recent critics have included Pearce (1985; 1987) and Kohn 
(1993).  The latter lists a number of problems with performance related pay systems: 
pay is not a motivator; rewards punish non-recipients; differential rewards rupture 
teamwork; rewards ignore reasons; rewards discourage risk-taking; and rewards 
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undermine interest. Kohn quotes Deci’s and Ryan’s research in the early 1970s which 
showed that ‘any contingent payment system tends to undermine intrinsic motivation’ 
(Kohn, 1993:512).  
 
UK critiques of performance related pay can be found in various studies including 
those by Bowey, Thorpe and Hellier (1986); Kinnie and Lowe (1990); Marsden and 
Richardson (1991); Cannell and Wood (1992); Kessler and Purcell (1992); Thompson 
(1993); Marsden and Richardson (1994); and Marsden and French (1998).  Without 
exception, all these studies found major problems in operationalising merit pay and 
considerable evidence of negative effects upon employee motivation. The studies 
based upon surveys of employees’ views were particularly critical but the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel and Development (IPD, 1999) found that managers, especially 
those in the public sector, were also critical. Public sector managers were ‘much less 
likely [than their private sector counterparts] to feel that their schemes are generating 
beneficial outcomes for their organisation on every indicator’ (IPD, 1998:6). 
Nevertheless, the same survey found little evidence of a lack of interest: 40% of 
organisations had individual performance related pay (IPRP) for managers and 25% 
for non-management grades, although the incidence was higher in the private sector 
than in the public sector. 
 
There are a number of ways in which pay can be related to performance.  In the 
simplest form, employees receive a merit bonus, usually unconsolidated into basic 
pay, on top of their normal pay. In some schemes, pay progression is consolidated and 
linked to an incremental scale. In other schemes, progression is a percentage increase 
applied within a broad pay band.  In many so called ‘all merit’ schemes, there is no 
annual cost of living underpinning increase (although, in reality, the average increase 
is usually close to the cost of living increase).  
 
Alternatives to linking pay to individual performance include both skills and 
competence based pay, whereby progression is linked to the acquisition of new skills 
or qualifications or the demonstration of key behavioural characteristics or 
competencies. Pritchard and Murlis (1992) distinguish between skills, which are 
concerned with practical abilities and expertise and may also include mastery of a 
certain body of knowledge, and competencies, which are related to underlying 
behavioural and attitudinal characteristics or traits needed to carry out the job 
effectively.  Competencies can be used for a range of HR purposes, including 
recruitment, career development and reward systems both for grading jobs and as 
criteria for pay progression. 
 
The attraction of skills or competency based progression over traditional output or 
target related performance pay is that it provides a longer term approach.  As Kessler 
(2000:274) suggests: ‘One of the many concerns raised with such (output related) 
schemes is that, by focusing upon output achievements, they encourage a narrow and 
blinkered concentration on specific tasks to the neglect of daily, behavioural 
requirements needed to perform the job in an all-round sense’.  In contrast, 
competency based systems reward employees for development within the job and link 
to the organisation’s core competencies.  Kessler (2000) points to a number of 
different circumstances and rationales for introducing competency based pay; in some 
cases it has been used to create a new organisational culture or to introduce new 
quality and customer service objectives. 
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Research evidence, however, indicates that there is limited use of both skills based 
and competency based schemes (Industrial Society, 1998). In a critique by Sparrow 
(1996), a number of deficiencies and problems with competence based systems were 
identified. First, he argued that the identification of the key competencies may rely on 
existing appraisal techniques which are not sufficient or robust enough for the 
purpose. Second, he argued that separating out in-built behaviour from that which can 
be developed is a complex and uncertain business. Third, he argued that managers 
have to make accurate judgements about revealed competency, a task to which most 
will not be equal. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that competency based schemes may be problematic in 
certain areas. A small scale survey of competency based approaches to human 
resource management in the British civil service indicated widespread support among 
HR managers, who nevertheless identified problems, including the difficulty in 
applying competency criteria and the complexity of competency frameworks 
(Farnham and Horton, 2000). 
 
A further problem with competency based systems, as with performance related pay, 
is the potential for gender or racial bias in the decisions of managers.  There is 
evidence that women and ethnic minorities are likely to be under-rated as 
performance or competence is equated with white, male behavioural characteristics 
(Bevan and Thompson, 1992; Civil Service College, 1995). Of course, traditional 
seniority based pay progression systems are not free of bias, particularly for women 
who take career breaks. 
 
Another alternative to performance related pay is the use of team based pay. (See, for 
instance, sub-section 1.2.4 on the use of team based pay instead of individual 
performance related pay (IPRP) for certain civil servants.) There are a number of 
ways in which the behaviour associated with teamworking can be rewarded. 
Teamwork can be assessed as part of an employee’s performance appraisal and thus 
feed into IPRP. Teamwork can be included as a criterion in a competency based 
grading scheme and thus feed into basic pay. Finally teamwork can be rewarded by a 
team bonus (Harrington, 2000).  It is largely this last aspect that interests reward 
management writers.  Again, however, team bonuses are fairly limited in practice 
(Thompson, 1995) and most common among manual workers, as surveys by the 
Industrial Society (1996) and the IPD (1994) have confirmed. Problems identified 
with team bonuses include the selection of viable criteria to judge team performance, 
especially if there is no tangible output; the transient nature of many teams; and the 
problem of equity in paying a collective bonus when levels of input to the team may 
be uneven (Armstrong, 2000). 
 
Organisation-wide reward systems are more common than team bonuses (IPD, 1994), 
largely because they have been encouraged by government. These include periodic 
bonuses based upon some measure of organisational performance (eg profits, 
turnover, share performance); profit-sharing schemes, profit related pay (PRP) and 
share ownership schemes. 
 
According to Hyman (2000) the link between financial participation and 
organisational performance is by no means well established and it is difficult to 
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separate out the effects of employee financial participation from wider forms of 
participation. In contrast, the Brookings Institution (Blinder, 1990) in the USA found 
that profit sharing raised productivity but employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) 
did not. Blinder (1990), however, concluded that changing the way workers were 
treated may boost productivity more than changing the way they were paid. 
      
In conclusion, there have been various attempts to link pay progression to some 
measure of individual worth, be it performance, skills or competence. Brown and 
Armstrong (1999) have brought all of these various methods together under the rubric 
of ‘pay for contribution’. 
1.5.5 Equity and equality 
Another major debate over recent years has been the increasing divide over whether 
pay policies should be based on the concept of equity/equality. According to equity 
theory, largely associated with Adams (1963), the major determinant of employee 
satisfaction at work is the extent to which the employee feels that he/she is fairly 
rewarded in comparison to colleagues. Employees are less interested in actual levels 
of pay than in the fair distribution of rewards within the workforce. Research projects 
established to test Adams’s equity theory have produced positive findings (Mowday, 
1996). 
 
There are, however, two schools of thought as to how equity is defined (Runciman, 
1995). On the one hand, there is a basic egalitarian approach. On the other hand, there 
is a libertarian view that the market should determine the distribution of rewards. The 
‘rate for the job’ relates to the egalitarian approach, while external pay referencing 
systems relate to the market approach. 
 
The introduction of sex discrimination and equal pay legislation, including the 'equal 
value’ provisions which stem from the European Union’s Council Directive 
75/117/EEC, have resulted in increased attention being paid to concepts of equality 
between men and women and the creation of gender neutral grading systems based on 
job evaluation. In contrast to the views expressed by the American 'new pay' writers 
that job evaluation is old fashioned and in decline, there is considerable evidence in 
the UK that the reverse is the case. Kessler reports that the use of job evaluation is 
found in around a half to three-quarters of organisations and a survey in the mid-
1990s found that a significant number of organisations were introducing job 
evaluation for the first time (Industrial Society, 1996). This is mainly because 
organisations are seeking to create grading structures which are resistant to equal 
value claims by employees (Hastings, 2000). Also, job evaluation remains popular 
because ‘job size remains a key support to grading structures and crucial to more 
general notions of career development within the organisation’ (Kessler, 2000:278).  
 
Nevertheless, while job evaluation remains important, there have been attempts to 
create less rigid and bureaucratic systems (IRS, 1996; Industrial Society, 1996). In 
particular there have been moves towards simplified structures, including integrated 
systems for all staff and the use of competencies as the basis for grade classification, 
rather than the traditional job description. This has allowed organisations to create a 
more ‘person’ centred form of grade classification, rather than the traditional 
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concentration on the content of the job. (See Armstrong and Baron, 1995; Pritchard 
and Murlis, 1992). 
 
Another development has been the use of so-called ‘broad banding’ structures to 
grade employees.  These structures have been devised to strike some sort of balance 
between the need for task flexibility on the one hand and role demarcation on the 
other. They involve the replacement of numerous grades, each with its own salary 
scale, with a smaller number of wider pay bands, often based on just a simple 
minimum and maximum with no intermediate incremental points. This allows a larger 
number of jobs to be subsumed into the wide band and is seen as particularly useful 
where organisational structures have become flatter and thus where the opportunities 
for career progression are limited. Employers have much more discretion with such 
broad band systems, than with narrower grades, to place and progress individual 
employees. The evidence again, however, suggests that there has been limited take-up 
of broad banding among organisations (Industrial Society, 1997).   
1.5.6 Harmonisation 
Other current trends in reward systems, apart from those proposed by 'new pay' 
writers, include harmonisation and variable hours. According to the latest 1998 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS, formerly WIRS), there has been a 
shift towards ‘single table’ arrangements whereby all the unions in a workplace 
negotiate together as a single unit. This development has been most common in the 
public sector: 23% of public sector workplaces in 1990 had single table bargaining 
rising to 70% of such workplaces in 1998 (Millward et al, 2000). Moreover, single 
table bargaining has led to increasing harmonisation of terms and conditions. The 
trend towards single table bargaining is driven by the effects of decentralisation, 
deregulation and privatisation; the changing structure of employment; the blurring of 
job boundaries through technological change; and in the private sector only the 
increased presence of both US and Japanese owned firms, both of which tend to 
favour single status (and single union) arrangements within the UK (Price and Price, 
1994; Russell, 1998; Druker, 2000) 
 
The impetus for harmonisation of manual and non-manual workers’ terms and 
conditions often comes from union demands for equity, but its introduction usually 
stems from a management initiative (Farnham and Pimlott, 1995:326; Russell, 
1998:14).  The gains identified for management include improved efficiency and 
productivity, such as improved time keeping, lower labour turnover and reduced 
absence rates, but less tangible benefits include improvements in worker morale, 
attitude to work, loyalty and commitment (Russell, 1998:15).  The ending of 
restrictive work practices, rigid job and skill demarcation, job rights and trade 
boundaries are also identified by Russell as key objectives for employers in 
negotiating harmonised terms.  These changes allow for the development of multi-
skilling and team working and a more flexible approach to job design. In some cases, 
the shift to salaried status for manual workers has entailed agreements to consolidate 
allowances and premium payments into basic pay, thereby additionally cutting labour 
costs. 
 
For manual employees harmonisation often provides benefits in improved pay levels; 
greater stability in weekly earnings; and enhanced career potential. Non-manual 
 23
workers, however, may resent their loss of status and seek to defend their privileges. 
Farnham and Pimlott (1995:326) argue: ‘Effective harmonisation ultimately requires 
fundamental changes in employee attitudes and in managerial attitudes to the two 
groups, with sometimes radical changes in working methods’.     
 
There are a number of different approaches to harmonisation. The pay of different 
groups of employees may be brought together on to a single integrated pay system, 
but a divide may still exist in respect of other terms and conditions (eg lower paid 
staff may receive fewer or lower levels of benefits than higher paid staff).  
Alternatively, staff may move on to a single pay spine with common terms and 
conditions, including working hours (often called single status), usually with 
harmonisation upwards, not downwards. Of course, in reality no organisation has 
completely single status conditions as managers will usually have access to ‘perks’ 
(eg company cars) which are not available to other workers.  
1.5.7 Variable hours 
Variability does not only relate to pay. It also relates to hours. Traditionally, 
employees work a set number of hours per week and meet any further fluctuations in 
the demand for the provision of goods and services by working overtime and/or 
working weekends/nights when premia are paid. Under such arrangements the 
employee’s pay may vary from pay period to pay period according to the overtime/ 
unsocial hours worked. 
 
An alternative is to allow for variation in hours while keeping constant employees’ 
pay. This can take the form of what is commonly called flexitime where employees 
work certain core hours, but outside the core can vary the hours within a defined 
range and carry over credit or debit hours from one period, for instance a month, to 
another. Such a system gives a significant amount of discretion to the employee over 
the hours worked, though not varying the pay the employee receives and is useful to 
the employer who wishes to attract workers. 
 
Another form of hours variability is flexible rostering, where the employee does not 
work a set shift, eg permanent nights, and the employer decides the pattern of shift 
working which varies from period to period, for instance a week or a month. In return 
for this flexibility the employee is rewarded by a percentage addition to the annual 
salary. A variation is self-rostering, where again the pattern of shift working varies, 
but pay is constant and the employee has choice of shift, within certain parameters. 
 
Annual hours, whose basic principle is that working time is defined in terms of the 
year rather than the week, also provides for variability in hours, but constancy in pay. 
There are two main types: in one type the emphasis is on the variability of weekly 
hours with work periods longer in busy times and shorter during slack times. In the 
second type rostered hours are less than the agreed annual hours: workers are 
effectively on-call for the non-rostered time and can be required to come into work to 
cover unforeseen circumstances (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2000). According to IDS 
(1991) employers have introduced annual hours or flexible rostering not only to match 
hours to business needs but also to eliminate the costs of overtime. Connected with 
this is the employer’s enhanced ability to predict labour costs more accurately. The 
main benefit to the employee is the predictability of earnings over the year, but the 
 24
main disadvantage stems from the employee’s inability to plan personal commitments 
such as child-care arrangements. 
 
According to IRS (1998a) annual hours were more common among manual than non-
manual employees, while Arrowsmith and Sisson (2000) said that ‘annual hours 
remain very much a minority practice’ but its incidence is increasing. This is reflected 
in the findings of Arrowsmith and Mossé, (2000) in respect of NHS trusts. In 1996 
and 1997 one in 10 trusts reported the adoption of annual hours for some employees. 
This increased to one in five in 1998. 
 
1.5.8 Determining pay: a wider picture  
The preceding sections have discussed a number of discrete areas that affect pay 
determination.  Grimshaw (2000), taking a wider stance, argues that various factors 
interrelate to determine pay and often conflict with each other.  For instance, internal 
norms, such as custom and practice, may conflict with wage differentials in the 
external labour market and the importation of a performance related pay system may 
conflict with the industrial relations traditions of the organisation.  Grimshaw (2000) 
provides a model of the interrelationship between these factors and pay practices; see 
figure 1.1 below. 
 
Figure 1.1:  The three 'rings' of pressures shaping change in pay practices 
(Grimshaw, 2000) 
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Returning specifically to the public services, while the impact of current trends in 
reward management and ‘new pay’ ideas can be detected, this has happened in a 
refracted manner (see White, 1999). According to Kessler and Purcell (1996), there 
has been some imbibing of the contingency view, ie that pay systems should be 
contingent on business strategy, and the concept that pay should become more 
individualised.  These ideas, however, have been moderated by the traditions of 
British public sector industrial relations. In the public services, there remains a 
concern to incorporate certain aspects of ‘best practice’, including transparency and 
equity. Furthermore, the continuing presence of strong trade unions, not least among 
powerful groups of professional staff, mediates the more radical ideas of the ‘new 
pay’ literature. 
1.6 Summary 
Part one of this report places in context our research on innovations in NHS pay and 
grading. It first reviewed both the changes and continuity in policy between the 
Conservative governments 1979-1997 and the Labour administration 1997-2001. 
Second, it looked at pay for school teachers and the civil service, where there is a 
continuing concern with performance related pay, and at the universities. The last 
have been examining issues related to the simplification of pay determination systems 
and the equality proofing of the grading structure. Third, the report examined local 
government, particularly the 1997 single status agreement, where implementation has 
been slow, largely for cost reasons and the need for agreement locally on a wide range 
of matters. Fourth, the report looked at the NHS. The Whitley system has been 
criticised on four main grounds connected with its structure, complexity, lack of 
flexibility and equal value problems.  These criticisms could be addressed at least in 
part when NHS trusts were established from 1991, as they had the freedom to 
introduce their own pay systems. In fact, however, trusts’ use of this freedom has been 
limited: few have introduced new systems for most of their staff. There are a number 
of reasons for this including the legal position, the continuance of national pay 
arrangements and institutional obstacles. 
 
Finally, part one of this report turns to the ‘new pay’ ideas and current trends in 
reward management. The ‘new pay’ literature stresses the need for a strategic 
approach to pay to be adopted, for pay to be related to the individual’s contribution, 
(despite much evidence from surveys of the disbenefits of such an approach) and 
broad banded grading structures. Other current trends in reward management include 
harmonisation and a number of approaches whereby employees’ pay is kept constant, 
despite variations in the amount and timing of the weekly hours worked. These ideas 
and trends, however, have been moderated by the traditions of British industrial 
relations.
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PART TWO: ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
Part two of this volume is divided into three sections.  The first section outlines our 
research questions and describes our research methodology.  The second section 
reports our research findings.  These are presented under the following thematic 
headings: 
 
• Trust aims and objectives 
• Pay systems 
• Pay progression 
• Process 
• Costs 
• Evaluation 
• Outcomes 
 
These thematic headings are not exclusive categories, rather they are used to organise 
the data.   In our final section, discussion and conclusions, we revisit our research 
questions, pulling together the literature and our findings. 
 
Our report intentionally draws selectively from our data to illustrate points being 
discussed.  Tables and figures summarise the position in each trust. We emphasise 
that all figures in this report are designed to provide an immediate graphical 
impression and are not intended as statistical representations. 
 
2.2 The research 
2.2.1 The research questions 
This part of our report addresses the research questions and outlines our methodology. 
Our original research questions as outlined in our proposal (December 1999) (see 
Appendix A) were reformulated to take account of our literature review, absorbing 
our earlier questions.  Our revised research questions were as follows: 
 
• Did local pay resolve the problems associated with Whitley? 
 
• What were the consequences of local pay? 
 
• Were the trusts’ pay systems introduced in line with 'new pay' ideas and current 
trends in reward management? 
 
• What factors were critical to the success of developing and implementing new pay 
systems in NHS trusts?  
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2.2.2 Methods and sample 
We discuss here both the 10 case study trusts selected and the methods of data 
collection. 
2.2.2.1.The case study trusts 
 
Our work focused on the experience of 10 NHS trusts in England (see table 2.1). 
These 10 trusts were selected after discussion with the Department of Health as case 
studies to illustrate a variety of different approaches to pay and grading and highlight 
the themes and issues that arose in making innovations. This sample provided 
relatively fine grained data and captured the rationales, possibilities and constraints in 
some detail. The sample was not, however, statistically representative of all trusts in 
England, nor was it statistically representative of all trusts which introduced changes 
in pay and grading. So it was not possible to gross up the findings to the country as a 
whole. 
 
Table 2.1: Trusts by NHS region, type and size 
 
No. non-medical employeesa
(at Sep. 1999) 
 Trust 
 
NHS region 
Headcount WTE 
    
Acute Teaching 1 
 
Trent 4,286 3,447 
Acute Teaching 2 
 
Trent 4,534 3,667 
Acute Teaching 3 
 
London 3,744 3,423 
Community 
  
South East 1,805 1,040 
Large Acute 
 
Eastern 2,151 1,799 
Multiservice 1 
 
South East 2,687 2,287 
Multiservice 2 
 
Eastern 2,361 1,809 
Multiservice 3:  
 
North West 4,557 3,618 
Very Large Acute 1 
 
Trent 4,409 3,605 
Very Large Acute 2 
 
Northern & Yorkshire 4,419 3,513 
 
Source:  a NHS Executive, 1999b. 
 
Very Large Acute 1 was the result of a merger in 1998 between two hospitals (Urban 
1 and Urban 2) which had, and still had at the time of writing, different pay systems. 
Therefore, we refer to Urban 1, Urban 2 or Very Large Acute 1 as appropriate. Acute 
Teaching 1 merged with two other trusts in April 2000. As this post-dated the 
commencement of this research, our report deals only with the pre-merged trust. 
 
The 10 trusts in this study, which were geographically located across England, were 
situated in seven out of the eight NHS regions (table 2.1). (South West region was the 
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only region without a trust in our sample.) Three of the case study trusts were in the 
Trent region, two in Eastern region, two in the South-East, with other trusts from the 
London, Northern and Yorkshire and North West regions. Three of the trusts have 
paid cost of living supplements under a national scheme for qualified nurses and 
professions allied to medicine (PAMs) as from 1 April 2001, which attests to their 
labour market problems. We sought to include another London NHS trust in our 
sample, but unfortunately though initially we were promised co-operation, we were 
then not given access. 
 
Our 10 trusts provided a range of differing services, reflecting the diverse nature of 
NHS trusts in England.  Three were acute teaching trusts, three were acute trusts, 
three were multiservice trusts and one was a specialised community trust (table 2.1).  
We intentionally did not include any ambulance NHS trusts as the type of service 
provided, and the main occupational groups employed, are not found elsewhere in the 
NHS.  Moreover, ambulance trusts unlike other NHS trusts, only employ a few 
occupational groups.  Therefore, their industrial relations structures are less complex. 
 
The 10 trusts varied in size both in income and in number of employees.  Department 
of Health figures on trust income for 1999/00 were still provisional and subject to 
continuing audit at the time of writing (at January 2001). Accordingly, 1998/99 
figures were used (NHS Executive, 1999a). Annual income for the year 1998/99 
ranged from £32,529 million to £185,927 million (median  £127,770 million) in our 
case study trusts.  Income of the 402 NHS trusts in England for this period spanned 
£2,592 to £432,071 million, the average being £68,276 million (mean figure; median 
£59,169 million). These figures suggest that, as a group, the 10 trusts in this study 
received larger incomes than the national average.  Since becoming trusts, all study 
sites have met their three financial duties: to balance income against expenditure 
(taking one year with another), to operate within externally set financing limits and to 
achieve a capital cost absorption rate of 6%.   
 
As to employees, at September 1999 the total number of non-medical employees, 
based on headcount, in our 10 trusts ranged from 1,805 to 4,557 (median 4,015) (table 
2.2).  Comparative figures for all NHS trusts in England, using September 1999 data 
(NHS Executive, 1999b), spanned from 202 to 10,800 employees (median 2,060).  
These figures suggest that, as a group, the 10 trusts in this study had a greater number 
of non-medical employees than the national average. 
 
As mentioned above (this sub-section) the trusts were selected because they had made 
some pay innovations. Some trusts had introduced changes to pay systems as early as 
1994 (Urban 1), with others introducing changes up to the time of our fieldwork (eg 
Acute Teaching 2, and Acute Teaching 3). Thus we were able to examine both the 
immediate and longer term effects of changes in payment systems. 
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 Figure 2.1: Trusts' changes to pay by staff coverage: a comparison 
 
 
 
 
No non-medical staff 
affected by trust pay 
No change  
from national 
arrangements 
All change  
from national 
arrangements 
Multiservice 3 
Community 
Large Acute 
Multiservice 1 
Multiservice 2 
Acute Teaching 2 
Very Large Acute 1 
Very Large Acute 2 
Acute Teaching 3 
Acute Teaching 1 * 
All non-medical staff 
affected by trust pay 
• Nearly all non-medical staff eligible, but only a minority transferred.   
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The trusts studied adopted a range of different approaches to terms and conditions.  
Some made radical changes to the national arrangements whereas others made 
minimal changes.  Some introduced changes for most non-medical staff whereas 
others introduced changes for only a few non-medical staff.  Figure 2.1 depicts the 
extent to which the trust's pay system departed from Whitley and the proportion of the 
trust's non-medical staff affected by revised pay arrangements. 
2.2.2.2 Documents 
 
Having selected the case study trusts, we then began to collect relevant documents. 
We perused secondary sources, such as reports from Incomes Data Services and 
Industrial Relations Services. We also asked for a range of trust documents as set out 
in table 2.2. Unfortunately we were not always able to obtain these documents 
because they had been mislaid eg because of office moves. Accordingly, the table 
notes whether the documents were provided.  
 
In some instances although documents were provided, they were inadequate for our 
purposes. For instance one trust only supplied labour turnover data for one year. For a 
fuller discussion see sub section 2.3.7.4. Also the monitoring and evaluation varied 
greatly in its depth and nature. In some trusts the HR director reported to the board 
only the numbers of employees on trust pay. In other trusts, evaluation encompassed a 
survey of employee attitudes to a new performance system. See section 2.6. 
 
In many trusts, however, we were provided with documents which are not listed in the 
table. For instance one trust provided us with the management consultant’s report 
drawn up before any pay changes were made. In two trusts the staff side secretaries 
lent us their entire files. These documents provided us with important background, 
although we were not always at liberty to quote from them. 
2.2.2.3 Interviews 
 
The research was carried out between March 2000 and January 2001. As well as 
being based on an inspection of documents, 73 tape-recorded interview sessions were 
conducted incorporating management, union and staff perspectives (table 2.3). 
Managerial staff were interviewed on a one to one basis and interviews typically 
lasted forty five minutes to one and a half hours.  The director of human 
resources/head of personnel (or equivalent title), or in one case the deputy HR 
director, was interviewed in all 10 trusts.  In addition, other personnel managers were 
seen in four trusts.  The director of finance was interviewed in eight of the 10 trusts.  
Additional management interviewees typically included the director of nursing and 
managers of clinical directorates. We were able to interview two ‘line managers’, ie 
heads of clinical directorates, in eight trusts. Where trusts applied new pay systems to 
some occupational groups only, we interviewed one manager whose staff were 
eligible for a new pay system and another line manager whose staff were not. The 
questions varied according to the pay system in place and the HR manager 
interviewed was asked about the features of the pay innovations that had been 
introduced, how the changes had been put in place, the nature of the unions’ role and 
the costs incurred. 
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Table 2.2: Documents  
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Acute Teaching 1 √ √ √ √ √ x √ √ √ 
Acute Teaching 2 √ √ x √ √ x √ √ √ 
Acute Teaching 3 √ √ √ x √ √ √ √ √ 
Community √ √ x √ √ √ x √ x 
Large Acute √ √ x   x x √ √ x √ 
Multiservice 1 √ √ x √ √ √ x √ √ 
Multiservice 2 √ √ √ √ √ √ x √ x 
Multiservice 3 √ √ √ √ √ x    x x N/A
Very Large Acute 1 
(Urban 1) 
√ √ x √ √ x √ √ √ 
Very Large Acute 2 √ √ √ √ √ x √ √ √ 
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Other questions to the HR managers, the nursing director and the line managers 
covered: 
 
• the original aims and objectives of pay innovations and whether they varied over 
time, 
• the impact of the pay system on recruitment, retention, workloads, career 
progression, working practices, teamworking, morale, 
• the resources in management time needed to introduce new pay systems, 
• the evaluation undertaken. 
 
The questions to the finance director centred on the pay bill costs. 
  
Union representatives, who were seen in all 10 trusts, were mostly interviewed using 
group techniques with sessions lasting approximately one and a half to two hours.  
Our primary aim was that these group sessions would include either the chair and/or 
the secretary of the staff side. On occasion, however, largely due to work 
commitments, a substitution was necessary.  We also aimed to ensure that the major 
unions in the trust, generally Unison and the RCN, were represented in our fieldwork. 
The union representatives were asked about what they thought were management’s 
aims in introducing new pay arrangements, the nature of the staff side involvement 
and the impact of pay innovations on recruitment, retention, workloads, career 
progression, working practices, teamworking and morale. 
 
Table 2.3: Fieldwork 
 
Trust: 
NHS region 
No. interviews conducted 
 
Management Union Staff Total  
One to one 
interviews 
Group 
interviews 
Focus 
groups 
 
Acute Teaching 1 
 
3 1 0 4
Acute Teaching 2 
 
5 1† 3 9
Acute Teaching 3  
 
5* 1 2 8
Community 
 
5 2‡ 2 9
Large Acute 
 
5 1 1 7
Multiservice 1 
 
6 1 3 10
Multiservice 2 
 
5* 1** 3 9
Multiservice 3:  
 
4 1† 2 7
Very Large Acute 1 
 
3** 1 0 4
Very Large Acute 2 
 
5* 1 0 6
Totals 46 11 16 73
 
*  In one of these interviews two respondents were present. 
**  In addition, a sole union representative was separately interviewed. 
† Interview with single staff side representative only. 
‡ Interviews were held with two staff side representatives individually. 
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Employee interviews utilised focus group techniques.  In contrast to group interviews, 
focus groups were characterised by an emphasis on staff interaction to investigate and 
explore common and/or different perceptions relating to pay arrangements and each 
focus group typically comprised eight employees.  Employee focus groups typically 
lasted one to one and a half hours and included employees from a range of divisions, 
including theatres and oncology. Where pay systems affected some occupational 
groups only, one focus group was selected from staff eligible for the trust’s pay 
system and who came from a clinical directorate where we had interviewed the line 
manager and one focus group was selected from staff who were only eligible for the 
national arrangements and who came from a clinical directorate where we had 
interviewed the line manager. Focus groups discussed the impact of the pay system 
upon recruitment, retention, workloads, morale, career progression, teamworking and 
working practices. 
   
2.2.3 Summary 
This section describes the data on which this report is based. In summary, we 
conducted case studies of 10 trusts which were primarily selected to show a range of 
approaches to pay and which varied in function, size and geographical location. Our 
data were based on documents and 73 interview sessions comprising either one-to-one 
interviews, group interviews or staff focus groups. Our data addressed four research 
questions: whether trust pay systems resolved the problems associated with Whitley, 
the consequences of trust pay, the extent to which trust pay systems incorporated ‘new 
pay’ ideas and current trends in reward management and the factors critical to success 
in developing and implementing new pay systems. 
2.3 The findings 
2.3.1 Trust aims and objectives 
This part of our report presents our findings under the following headings: trust aims 
and objectives, pay systems, pay progression, process, costs, evaluation and 
outcomes. These headings do not represent exclusive categories, rather they are used 
to organise our data. We begin by looking at trust aims and objectives. 
 
Our data revealed that the aims and objectives of introducing new pay arrangements 
varied according to several factors, particularly the aims and objectives of 
stakeholders, eg management and/or unions. Focusing on management aims and 
objectives, our data was largely based on management interviewees’ recollections, as 
we were often not provided with the original documentation proposing pay changes.  
Broadly, management aims could be categorised as value driven or issue driven.  
Whilst we emphasise that these approaches do not necessarily represent discrete 
categories, the former espoused concerns such as fairness, simplicity, equity, 
performance management and enhanced patient care.  The latter related to more 
practical concerns such as recruitment and retention and temporal and functional 
flexibility.  For instance, Very Large Acute 2 described its aims and objectives in an 
annual report in values terms: 'a flexible, equitable and simple approach to pay and 
conditions of service’.  In contrast, interviewees at Multiservice 2 informed us that the 
main objective of their new pay system in theatres was the removal of  ‘artificial 
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barriers between surgical skills and anaesthetic skills of the theatre practitioners’.  
Interestingly, our data revealed that theatres were regarded as a priority area.  In all 
but two of our trusts which had theatres changes were made to the pay and conditions 
of theatre staff. (The exceptions were Large Acute and Multiservice 3)  In particular 
management wanted to align the work of ODAs/ODPs and theatre nurses.  
 
Notably, scrutiny of our data revealed that trusts adopted a values based approach 
where they were proposing to introduce pay changes for a significant proportion of 
their workforce throughout their organisation.  Conversely, where trusts were 
proposing to introduce pay changes for a discrete area only, eg a department or 
occupational category, issues driven approaches were adopted. 
 
Costs were also an influential factor.  On the one hand some trusts were of the view 
that pay changes would not lead to an increase in the paybill.  Higher basic pay would 
be offset by the consolidation of unsocial hours payments into basic pay, as occurred 
at Community.  On the other hand, an expectation that a new pay system might be 
costly deterred some trusts from developing and/or introducing more extensive 
changes to pay arrangements, for instance at Acute Teaching 3 and Large Acute.   
 
Managerial perspectives were not necessarily static over time.  In some trusts, whilst 
initial concerns centred on value driven aspects, issues related concerns came to the 
fore in later years.  Our data revealed two examples of this situation and in both cases 
there was a considerable delay between development and implementation of the new 
pay arrangements.  At Acute Teaching 3, whilst initial aims related essentially to 
flexibility and performance management, by the time the scheme had got underway 
recruitment and retention were becoming issues.  At Acute Teaching 2, where initial 
concerns were value driven, a 1998 report to the board stated: 'The pressure to 
develop harmonised terms and conditions, although commencing at a corporate level 
are now primarily bottom up'.  Interestingly however, there was no evidence of issue 
related concerns evolving into value related concerns. 
 
In many trusts, the need to manage performance was not stated overtly as an aim. 
Nevertheless, some interviewees suggested that this was an implicit consideration 
which could fall under the rubric of enhanced patient care or flexibility.  For instance 
at Urban 1 a management interviewee suggested that at least part of the rationale for 
changes in pay regimes for nurses and midwives and other occupational groups was 
the link of pay determination to performance management. Realisation of the aims 
and objectives was contingent upon the party/parties who championed the new 
arrangements.  In addition to the human resources director, in some trusts influential 
roles were played by others, eg the trust board members at Multiservice 1, the director 
of nursing services at Acute Teaching 3. 
 
The unions did not favour any departure from national pay arrangements.  Given that 
principled stance, they adopted pragmatic approaches.  Some became involved to seek 
to influence the direction of changes.  For example, at Community the aims and 
objectives of unions were to limit any potential adverse impact.  At other trusts, the 
unions considered local pay arrangements as a means of increasing salaries for some 
staff (Acute Teaching 2) or enhancing staff development (Large Acute).  At Acute 
Teaching 1 the unions refused to enter into discussions as they did not want to be seen 
to endorse, in any respect, the introduction of local pay.  Unions, on the whole, were 
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particularly opposed to performance pay and the abolition of service based 
increments.  Nevertheless, at Large Acute the introduction of new competency based 
pay progression criteria for clinical support workers were developed from a union 
proposal and the full time union official was an important champion (see sub-section 
2.3.4.1). 
2.3.2 Pay systems 
We deal here with the proportion of employees covered by trust pay systems, grading 
structures, the incorporation of premia and allowances into basic pay, the 
harmonisation of terms and conditions, annual settlements and market supplements. 
2.3.2.1 Coverage: eligibility and take-up 
 
The extent to which trust employees were eligible for local pay systems varied 
considerably. On the one hand, at Multiservice 3 none were eligible: the trust used the 
flexibility provided under Whitley to introduce new on-call arrangements for certain 
staff.  On the other hand, in three trusts, there were local arrangements for which all 
non-medical staff were eligible, while in the remaining trusts only discrete 
occupational groups were eligible for the new arrangements.  This ranged from less 
than 100 to some 4,000. Details of eligibility appear in table 2.4. 
 
Eligibility and take-up, although related, are not the same and a number of factors 
appear to have influenced take-up rates: first, the length of time since the trust pay 
system was introduced allied to labour turnover rates. Under the common law a 
contract can only be varied by agreement and under statute the Transfer of 
Undertaking (Protection of Employment) Regulations provide that existing employees 
who stay in the same job can opt to remain to be covered by the national 
arrangements, even though their employer is the trust, not the health authority as 
before. Thus, whereas Multiservice 1 and Very Large Acute 2 introduced new pay 
systems for all non-medical staff except directors in 1994, actual take-up was some 10 
percentage points higher in the latter than the former trust at the time of our fieldwork 
(summer 2000).  This may be partly because Multiservice 1, which was near London, 
had higher labour turnover rates than Very Large Acute 2, which was in the north 
east.  Details of take-up appear in table 2.4. 
 
A second factor influencing take-up was whether the new pay system radically 
departed from the national arrangements. Employees may feel that the closer the trust 
pay system is to the national arrangements, the less they are at risk. For instance at 
Acute Teaching 3 in respect of nurses, midwives and support workers and at Large 
Acute in respect of clinical support workers and midwives, the trust arrangements 
complied with the national pay points (though the pay progression system differed) 
and in both these trusts the overwhelming majority of eligible staff had accepted the 
new system. Indeed, at Acute Teaching 3, two of the new D grade nurses in one of our 
focus groups were unaware that they were on a trust pay system. Perhaps, however, 
this was not surprising given that a recent advertisement in the Nursing Times (2000) 
for nurses in the cardiothoracic unit did not refer to the trust’s competency based pay 
system. 
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Table 2.4: Trust pay arrangements by coverage 
 
Trust Staff groups eligible Take-up a (%) 
Acute Teaching 1 All non-medical staff except scientists, 
pharmacists, estates officers. 
 
25 
Acute Teaching 2 All theatre staff 
 
90 
Acute Teaching 3 Nurses, midwives, health visitors, support workers 
 
90 
Community All non-medical staff except grade B clinical 
psychologists 
 
65 
Large Acute Maintenance craftsmen 
Clinical sterile support department 
Nearly all CSWs 
Midwives 
100 
100 
90 
>65 
Multiservice 1 All non-medical staff 
 
75-80 
Multiservice 2 Qualified theatre staff only 
 
92 
Multiservice 3 Some pathology laboratory staff 
 
N/A c
Very Large Acute 1:  
  Urban 1 
  Urban 2 
 
Nurses, midwives b
A & E, Trauma & Orthopaedics 
 
 
95 
>90 
 
Very Large Acute 2 All non-medical staff 
 
67 
 
a Take-up at time of fieldwork: April to September 2000. 
b Urban 1 also developed pay systems for admin. & clerical, hotel services, 'professional' staff, ODPs/ODAs. 
c Not applicable as changes centred on variation to Whitley terms. 
 
A third factor influencing take-up rates was the immediate financial incentive 
provided. For instance when the new pay arrangements for nurses, midwives and 
support workers were introduced at Urban 1 in 1994, staff moving on to the new 
structure were assimilated on to the next highest point plus an additional increment 
plus a further increment if the transfer took place in the first month, ie three 
increments worth 2% each. In fact the take-up rate amongst this occupational group 
was 95% by the time of the fieldwork. At Community, where a new pay system was 
also introduced in 1996, the take-up rate was 65% at the time of our fieldwork: staff 
transferring moved on to the next highest point, worth up to 4%. Interestingly at 
Multiservice 1 the financial incentive was not immediate. Staff transferring moved 
across without any change to their pay, but all 'excellent' staff could continue to 
receive increases, whatever their position in the pay band, without hitting a ceiling 
and the take-up rate at the time of our fieldwork was 75%-80%.  
2.3.2.2 Grading structure 
 
Four of our nine trusts which introduced local pay arrangements, used the Medequate 
job evaluation system, while Multiservice 1 introduced ‘recruitment clusters’ based 
on a competency grading system. At Urban 1 the Hay job evaluation system was used 
for so called professional staff, ie staff whose role was substantially managerial or 
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where an individual was a professional head of a service or department. The Hay job 
evaluation system was also used at Urban 2 in Accident & Emergency and Trauma & 
Orthopaedics to support a new patient focused care system. 
 
Large Acute and Acute Teaching 3 both eschewed job evaluation and closely based 
their grading structures on the Whitley grading structures. Acute Teaching 2 apart, the 
unions in the trusts which used Medequate had profound reservations. A comment by 
a staff representative at Community was not untypical: 
 
[Medequate] wasn’t initially designed for the health service…It was very obviously biased in 
certain areas… budget holders and people who controlled a lot of staff… against therefore 
clinical staff who maybe don’t have a lot of budgetary control or don’t control a lot of staff, but 
actually… do a very complex and difficult job. 
 
Three of the 10 trusts which we studied created single pay spines, (Acute Teaching 1, 
Community and Very Large Acute 2). Interestingly, although the unions rejected the 
concept of a single spine when it was proposed by the King’s Fund/National 
Association of Health Authorities (1985) (see sub-section 1.4.4), some 10 years later 
this was not a stumbling block. Indeed, managers at Community cited the single pay 
spine as a major strength and expressed concern about the proposal under Agenda for 
Change to introduce three pay spines. The unions, too, approved of the single pay 
spine which covered all employees whether they were ‘a nurse or a painter’. At Very 
Large Acute 2 the single spine was seen by management as a means of deterring equal 
value claims and was acceptable, in principle, to the unions. The unions' main concern 
related to the performance element of the pay system. At Acute Teaching 1 (where the 
unions were not involved in the development of the pay system) the HR director saw 
the single pay spine as an enabler for teamworking. 
 
Three trusts (Acute Teaching 2, Acute Teaching 3, Multiservice 2,) had originally 
intended to cover all the non-medical staff in the trust but for a number of pragmatic 
reasons, including cost pressures, had not done so. Indeed, Acute Teaching 2 had 
‘Medequated’ jobs throughout the trust. 
 
Another significant feature of the grading structure was whether the trusts essentially 
continued to follow the spans determined nationally or introduced broader bands. 
Multiservice 1, which had no pay ceilings on its bands, just minima, was at one end of 
the spectrum having broad bands. Multiservice 2 introduced a three grade structure 
covering four nurse clinical grades and three medical technical officer grades, while 
Acute Teaching 2’s 10 grades were mostly broader than the Whitley grades. Others 
(Acute Teaching 1, Community and Very Large Acute 2), while introducing their own 
grading structures, in fact ended up with structures which were little different from the 
Whitley grading systems, while Large Acute only tinkered with the national grading 
systems and Multiservice 3 observed them completely.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
position.  
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 Figure 2.2: Departure from Whitley banding by trust 
 
 
The pay structure at Acute Teaching 3 at first sight seemed to be a broad banded one. 
The trust replaced the nine nursing and midwifery grades A to I with four bands: 
 
Band 1: Support worker (corresponds to grades A and B), 
Band 2: Qualified nurse/midwife (corresponds to grades D and E),  
Band 3: Senior qualified nurse/midwife (corresponds to grades F and G), 
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These broad bands, however, were subdivided to correspond with the clinical grades 
and staff could only move between the sub-bands if they had the competencies, the 
finance was available and the service required those competencies. Moreover, even if 
those conditions were satisfied, a formal interview was required if there was more 
than one suitable person in the area. As a union representative commented: 
 
The philosophy was to open up the barriers basically… but if you were working as a D grade 
and you’d met all the competencies and perhaps could go to an E grade, you’d still have to wait 
for a job to apply. 
 
This comment was consonant with that of a personnel director at another trust, who 
eschewed broad banding. He commented: 
 
It’s very difficult to control costs on a broad banding system… unless you build in lots of quotas 
and performance bars and artificial constraints which then defeat the whole object of the 
exercise. 
2.3.2.3  Terms and conditions: incorporation 
 
Leaving basic pay aside, we found that four out of our 10 trusts (Acute Teaching 3, 
Large Acute, Multiservice 15, Multiservice 3) did not move away from the national 
terms and conditions, which vary by occupational group, even though in one case, 
Multiservice 1, the trust made extensive changes to basic pay.  
 
Turning to the other trusts, we found that a key management aim in changing terms 
and conditions was to incorporate premia and allowances into basic pay to ensure 
simplicity. As the HR director of Community said: 
 
                                                 
5 Multiservice1 incorporated on-call payments into annual salaries for pathology staff 
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We rationalised the allowances… we wanted to get rid of allowances because there were a 
whole range that were meaningless and small amounts and when you advertise a post, why take 
it into account. You give the basic pay and don’t say plus laundry, plus psychiatric lead, plus 
this, plus all the rest. 
 
Connected with this was the aim of ensuring that although the timing at which work 
took place could vary, eg from week to week, the salary received would remain 
constant from one pay period to another. This has advantages for management in that 
it can predict the paybill and, perhaps reduce the costs of overtime/unsocial hours 
work. The advantage for staff is that earnings can be predicted and do not vary, for 
instance on account of annual leave or sickness. Thus, three trusts developed inclusive 
rates for the job based on the extent of the unsocial hours in the work pattern as 
follows: 
 
• Acute Teaching 2 (theatres): basic; basic + 3%, basic + 5%; basic + 8%. 
• Community: basic; basic + 8%; basic  + 15%. 
• Very Large Acute 2: basic; basic + 2%; basic + 5%; basic + 12½%. 
 
Acute Teaching 2 introduced the basic + 3% rate in 2000. Hitherto it had only two 
plus rates in addition to the basic rate. Very Large Acute 2 introduced a basic + 2% 
rate (for weekend working, but not shifts) in 1999. Before then it only had two plus 
rates in addition to the basic rate. Also in 1999/2000 it raised the highest rate in stages 
from 10% to 12½%. An interviewee commented that before the third lower rate was 
introduced, some staff who were doing quite a lot of unsocial hours were receiving 
the 5% enhancement, even though strictly speaking they did not meet the criteria for 
5%, but it was not equitable that they should only receive the basic salary. 
 
Very Large Acute 2 claimed that inclusive rates served to obviate the perverse 
incentives that operate under the Whitley system of premia. The acting personnel 
director commented that the ward sister, who draws up the off duties, would be 
tempted under Whitley ‘to put herself on duty at times when she was paid most, when 
it was least useful to the organisation in terms of her doing her management role’.  
  
Another example of an inclusive rate of pay despite variations in hours worked was 
the annual hours scheme for maintenance craftsmen at Large Acute. The agreement, 
effective from 1.9.97, was based on an annual hours agreement of 2,300 hours per 
year with provision of a full 24 hours service with overtime and call-out payments 
absorbed and new shift patterns designed to meet the needs of the service. 
 
At Multiservice 3, where external auditors found that the budget was uncontrollable 
as on-call payments were based on the timing of tests, not the workload, a continuous 
process pattern (CPP) agreement in respect of the haematology and clinical bio-
chemistry departments was introduced from September 1998. The agreement 
provided for a 24-hour rota system with an agreed sum divided equally between rota 
members. At Multiservice 2 unsocial hours payments for work during the week were 
incorporated into basic pay, but not for weekend work. 
 
As the NHS operates throughout the year on a seven-day a week, 24 hour basis, the 
relationship between pay and hours is a singular feature of this organisation. This 
relationship was addressed in varying ways as our data revealed and any configuration 
gave rise to both problems and solutions. See sub-section 2.3.7.2. 
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2.3.2.4  Terms and conditions: harmonisation 
 
Details of harmonisation are set out in table 2.6. Working hours and on-call were 
harmonised in five trusts. The standard 37.5 hours per week was adopted in place of 
the national arrangements under which working hours vary by occupational group.  
Nurses, midwives and health visitors have a working week of 37.5 hours and are the 
largest occupational group; thus the weighted average is 37.5 hours. 
 
At Acute Teaching 2, Community, Multiservice 2, and Very Large Acute 2 unsocial 
hours payments were not only incorporated into basic pay, they were also harmonised 
in respect of the different occupational groups. In contrast, Acute Teaching 1 and 
Urban 1 harmonised but did not incorporate. Also, whereas the former applied the 
rates payable to nurses and midwives to other occupational groups, the latter 
introduced a new, lower rate for most occupational groups (nurses, midwives, 
administrative and clerical staff, hotel services staff and ODAs/ODPs).  
 
Table 2.5: Harmonisation by trust 
 
Trust Working 
hours 
Unsocial 
hours 
Overtime On-call Annual 
leave 
 
Acute Teaching 1 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
(√) 
 
Acute Teaching 2* 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
Acute Teaching 3 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
Community  
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
Large Acute 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
Multiservice 1 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
Multiservice 2 **
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Multiservice 3 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
Very Large Acute 1***
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
x 
 
Very Large Acute 2 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
Multiservice 3 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
* Local pay applicable to theatre staff only and based on three separate rates/work patterns  
**Local pay applicable to theatre staff only  
*** Relates to Urban 1: nurses, midwives, admin. & clerical, hotel services, ODAs/ODPs. 
 
In six trusts overtime was also harmonised, but there was variation as to whether or 
not there was a reduction compared to the national arrangements (time + a half 
Monday to Saturday for nurses and double time on Sunday). Two trusts: Community 
and Very Large Acute 2 extended the nurses and midwives overtime rates to other 
occupational groups. Four trusts paid lower rates. Thus Multiservice 2 did not make 
any overtime payments to its theatre staff Monday to Friday and provided time plus 
one third on Saturday and time plus two thirds on Sunday and bank holiday. Urban 1 
paid time and a third Monday to Saturday and time and a half on Sunday. Acute 
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Teaching 2 paid overtime at time and a third for its theatre staff and Acute Teaching 1 
only paid overtime premia after 42 hours had been worked, ie the first 4 ½ hours 
above the contracted hours were only paid at the basic rate, with time off in lieu. 
 
Four trusts did not carry out any harmonisation. The finance director at Multiservice 1 
said that they wanted the new pay system, introduced in 1994, ‘to bed in properly’. 
Then the trust started to look at harmonising terms and conditions, but a change of 
government took place. 
 
Of all the major conditions annual leave was the least likely to be harmonised and 
continued to be related to grade and length of service, except for qualified theatre staff 
in Multiservice 2 and for all above level 1 at Acute Teaching 1. This was a pragmatic 
assessment of the costs entailed, not a principled stance. Nevertheless, even where 
harmonisation was not achieved, there was some standardisation. Data relating to the 
impact of harmonisation on teamworking are discussed in sub-section 2.3.7.5 below.  
2.3.2.5  Settlements 
As noted before, three trusts did not depart from the national pay points (Acute 
Teaching 3, Large Acute, Multiservice 3) and thus automatically applied the annual 
national settlements. The other seven trusts, whatever their freedom in theory, tailored 
their settlement to the national ones. At Acute Teaching 1, Community and Very 
Large Acute 2, where there were single spines, there were special considerations. 
First, the differential increases to the tops of certain grades by the nurses’ and PAMs’ 
pay review body in 1999 and 2000 necessitated some tinkering with trust scales to 
maintain equity between those on Whitley and those on trust contracts. Second, the 
pay review body award for nurses and PAMs was the benchmark, not the lower 
settlements applying to the non-pay review body groups and essentially all employees  
received the same percentage increase. 
2.3.2.6  Market supplements 
 
We were told that market supplements for certain groups of staff were applied at 
Community, (information technology (IT) `staff, finance staff and clinical 
psychologists); Very Large Acute 1 (administrative and clerical staff and hotel 
services staff where necessary); and at Very Large Acute 2  (medical electronics staff, 
pharmacists and radiographers). Only at Community were we aware that this caused 
tensions with those staff who did not receive such supplements and this tension arose 
only in respect of clinical psychologists and not in respect of IT and finance staff. 
2.3.3 Pay progression 
We focus first on the basis of pay progression, particularly progression based on 
performance and whether or not performance payments were consolidated. We then 
consider how performance pay was awarded and distributed. 
2.3.3.1 Basis 
 
In eight of our case study trusts the link between pay progression and service was 
replaced with a link between pay progression and performance. The main exception 
was Multiservice 3. At Acute Teaching 1, however, there were service-related 
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increments until employees reached the top of their grade, where they were eligible 
for a non-consolidated performance bonus. 
 
Only in Very Large Acute 2 was the performance related pay contingent upon the 
performance of the trust, not the individual.  The non-executive directors decided the 
amount based on the trust’s achievement of: 
 
• quality targets, as for example set out in the Patient’s Charter, 
• number of patients dealt with, as stipulated in the trust’s contracts with purchasers, 
• financial targets,  
• service developments, as set out in the trust’s business plan.   
 
To date (2000) the trust never achieved 100% of its targets and the actual performance 
award paid varied between 4.8% in 1994 to 7.2% in 1999. The researchers were 
informed that comprehensive information from each directorate was sent to the non-
executive directors prior to their decision on the annual performance award, but how 
they decided the extent to which targets were achieved and thus the performance 
award was not at all clear.   
 
Team bonuses were very rarely used in our case study trusts, only for some 10 
pharmacists at Acute Teaching 1 and for theatre staff at Acute Teaching 3 (where the 
pay arrangements were under review at the time of writing).  Individual performance 
related or competency based pay was much more common than team or organisation 
based pay and was found in eight of our trusts.  Competencies were either based on 
skills, or behaviours, or clinical care, or a combination.  Moreover, the competencies 
often varied significantly by occupational group.  At Large Acute, for instance, the 
competencies of clinical support workers were equated to the achievement and 
demonstration of skills, but the competencies for midwives were behavioural and 
professional/clinical. The mix of the behavioural and professional/clinical was also to 
be found for nurses, midwives and their support workers at Acute Teaching 2, Acute 
Teaching 3 and Multiservice. For instance at Multiservice 1 assessment was based on: 
 
• occupational skills, 
• client care, 
• decision making and problem solving, 
• interpersonal skills, 
• leadership skills, 
• planning and administration. 
 
At Urban 1 the criteria used to assess the performance of nurses and midwives under 
their performance pay scheme covered a range of behavioural attributes as clinical 
competence was assumed. The criteria used were weighted and there were eight 
headings: 
 
• process: assessment, planning implementation and  evaluation of care needs, 
• professional responsibility: staff and ward/department development, 
• research, 
• human relations: communications, relationship building, interpersonal 
understanding, personal awareness, 
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• teamwork, 
• adaptability, 
• attendance, 
• commitment to patient care. 
 
At Urban 2 performance assessment was based on a mixture of behavioural attributes 
and skills, using the English National Board’s 10 key characteristics and three 
additional characteristics as follows: 
 
• accountability,   • resource management, 
• clinical skills, • quality of care, 
• research, • change, 
• teamwork, • care planning,  
• innovation, • communication, 
• health promotion, • teaching skills. 
• staff development,   
 
In fact a new performance assessment scheme was being developed to merge the two 
different systems of staff appraisal at Urban 1 and Urban 2 in the wake of the merger 
of those two hospitals. The main aim was to introduce an assessment procedure which 
was more transparent, had a stronger evidence base and was less subjective. 
 
Our data suggested that trusts found it more straight forward to develop competencies 
based on skills than on more abstract clinical and behavioural attributes. The latter 
were often evaluated by means of employee portfolios or profiles which staff may not 
have found easy to compile. Acute Teaching 2 theatres' pay progression competency 
scheme, grade 6 said: ‘…profile construction is organised in your own time and there 
is no definitive method of producing one’, according to an internal document. 
 
At Acute Teaching 1 and Multiservice 2 the researchers did not obtain any criteria for 
performance assessment, whilst at Community the researchers were told that the 
trust’s competency profiles were primarily designed for recruitment purposes and, 
according to a management interviewee they were: 
 
… an additional tool at the performance development review to help the manager to decide 
whether to award the progression point. They are not used on their own to make that decision. 
2.3.3.2 Consolidation? 
 
Having considered the basis on which performance was assessed, we now consider 
how performance pay was applied in the nine trusts where there was 
performance/competency pay. In six of our trusts performance pay was consolidated 
and by incremental step. At Acute Teaching 1 a non-consolidated performance bonus 
was paid only to those at the top of their grade. 
 
Multiservice 1 and Very Large Acute 2 employed a mixture of both consolidated and 
non-consolidated payments. At the latter, half of the performance element (which as 
noted above was based on trust, not individual performance) was awarded as a 
consolidated increase and half as a non-consolidated lump sum, though those at the 
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top of the grade received only the unconsolidated half. At Multiservice 1, where there 
were no grade maxima, only minima,   
 
• staff rated ‘poor’ did not receive an increase, 
• staff rated ‘satisfactory’ received a consolidated percentage increase which in 
practice was in line with the national award, 
• staff rated ‘good’ received a consolidated percentage increase which in practice 
was some two percentage points above their colleagues rated satisfactory (ie 
broadly equivalent to half an increment under Whitley), 
• staff rated superior received the same consolidated percentage increase as those 
rated good, plus a non-consolidated bonus of 2%, 
• staff rated ‘excellent’ received the same consolidated percentage increase as those 
rated good, plus a non-consolidated bonus of 4%. 
2.3.3.3  Procedures 
 
Multiservice 3 had service related, not performance related, pay progression, as did 
Acute Teaching 1 which, however, provided a non-consolidated bonus for those at the 
top of the grade as noted above. The remaining eight trusts had performance related 
pay progression but only at Multiservice 1 was there a single annual performance 
award and no separate annual settlement based, for instance, on the cost of living 
and/or the national pay awards. All the other trusts distinguished between the annual 
settlement and the performance award. Of these trusts, three (Acute Teaching 2, 
Community and Very Large Acute 2) applied their annual performance award on a 
single date, while Urban 1 applied its annual performance award either on 1 April or 1 
October. The remainders applied a performance award according to the employee’s 
anniversary.  
 
It is debatable from the management viewpoint whether one approach is preferable to 
another but from the employee’s viewpoint there is a disadvantage in a once a year 
date as some time may elapse between appointment and pay progression. For instance 
at Acute Teaching 2, where there was pay progression for theatre staff on 1 April, 
only staff who had completed six months’ service in post, irrespective of whether this 
had been achieved by appointment, promotion or regrading could progress. Thus staff 
who joined after 1 October had to wait up to almost 18 months before they were 
eligible for a performance related increment. 
2.3.3.4  Distribution of awards 
 
Only at Urban 1 was there a forced distribution (where management prescribe the 
allocation of awards in advance) and a complex system to ensure paybill control. The 
appraisal resulted in the top 10% receiving a rating of 3; the next 20% receiving a 
rating of 2, the remainder receiving a rating of 1 unless they had a score of below 100, 
when they received a nil rating. The ratings determined the potential maximum salary 
increase, as each pay band had performance bars as follows: 
 
• Staff below bar 3 could receive a potential maximum salary increase of 6% if 
rated 3 and a potential maximum salary of 4% and 2% if rated 2 or 1 respectively.  
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• Staff between bars 3 and 2 could receive a potential maximum salary increase of 
4% if rated 3 and 2% if rated 2. Those rated 1 did not get a performance increase. 
 
• Staff above bar 2 who were rated 3 could receive a potential maximum salary 
increase of 2%. Those rated 2 and 1 did not get a performance increase.  
 
The bars limited the rate of progression and only high performers could progress to 
the maximum of the band. The next stage was for salary increases to be awarded. 
These were awarded in 0.5% bandings according to the number of points scored by 
the individual. Staff whose scores were in the bottom 45% of staff scores in each sub-
occupational group received a 2% salary increase (except that staff scoring below 100 
received no percentage increase). Staff scoring above the 45% trigger received a 
salary increase of between 2.5% and 6% split into eight bandings in 0.5% steps. Thus 
there was a forced distribution. The last stage was for the salary increase indicated by 
the score to be mediated by the employee’s position on the pay spine relative to the 
performance bars and the employee’s rating. 
 
At Multiservice 1 performance awards followed a bell curve: 20% of employees were 
expected to be assessed as poor or satisfactory; 60% of employees were expected to 
be assessed as good; 20% as superior or excellent. Departmental managers were able 
to deviate from this distribution but were required to meet additional costs from their 
budget. 
2.3.3.5  Discrimination in performance 
 
We now consider to what extent the performance related pay system discriminated 
between employees. At Multiservice 1 there was a five point rating scale and Urban 
1’s professional contribution rating system for nurses and midwives provided for 10 
possible levels of award: 0 and then nine bandings between 2% and 6%. In other 
words, the performance awards at these trusts were based on fine distinctions. 
 
At Community, 80% of staff received one performance based increment, while 10% 
received two increments and 10% received nothing. At Acute Teaching 2 theatre staff 
could only receive one competency based increment a year and different figures were 
mentioned in interviews as to the number of eligible staff who had not been given a 
competency increment in 1999, ranging from 10% to 25%.  
 
At Very Large Acute 2, all employees on trust terms received the same percentage 
performance increase (unless they were at the top of the grade when they received 
half the increase), but those who had a disciplinary warning extant or had been absent 
from work, whether or not on account of sickness, did not receive the award. 
Individuals absent for more than fifteen days, or on four separate occasions in a year 
lost 50% of their performance award. If this level of absence occurred in the 
following year then the individual lost 100%, ie all the performance award. Different 
figures were mentioned in interviews as to the number of eligible staff who had not 
been given a performance award ranging from 3% to 10%.  The unions were critical 
of the use of the absence based criterion, pointing to inequities between different parts 
of the trust. One interviewee remarked: 
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Yes in the early days I am led to believe that some divisions, some divisional leaders didn't 
believe in stopping the bonus for any reason, so there were certain divisions that never lost their 
bonus.  There were other divisions where, particularly facilities and staff within the facilities 
division, lost their bonus at the drop of a spoon.   
 
Accordingly changes were introduced in 2000. Absence for reasons of pregnancy and 
bereavement and occupationally induced sickness were no longer counted and, in the 
interests of consistency across the trust, a panel was set up to make a final decision on 
whether the award should be withheld.  
 
Whereas in most trusts the performance award discriminated between poor and better 
performers at least to some extent, in three trusts (Acute Teaching 3, Large Acute, 
Multiservice 2) the performance award was not normally withheld and a performance 
based increment was awarded. Accordingly, the pay progression system in practice 
was only a little different from the Whitley system of so-called automatic increments, 
where in theory an increment can be withheld from a poor performer. Management 
interviewees at Acute Teaching 3, however, maintained that the competency based 
pay progression system ensured that managers focused on performance in the job. As 
a result, the process of awarding increments differed and managers made a positive 
decision in respect of each job-holder. 
  
At Multiservice 2, according to an internal document in 1998, ‘the general approach is 
that staff are deemed entitled to their routine annual increment unless a major 
negative issue had been highlighted but not yet resolved following appropriate 
counselling’. A theatre practitioner II, however, who left on 15 April 1998, was 
recorded in her exit interview as never having had a management staff review in her 
six years of employment in the trust, including over one year on the new theatre pay 
system. 
 
Interestingly, our data revealed that trusts’ performance pay systems made fine 
distinctions where they had been introduced in the first half of the 1990s. The two 
trusts which introduced performance pay systems earliest, ie in 1994,  (Multiservice 1 
and Urban 1 in respect of nurses) introduced fine distinctions in their performance pay 
systems. In contrast, we found no examples of trusts which introduced their 
performance pay systems after 1996 making fine distinctions. 
2.3.4 Process 
In reporting on innovations in pay and grading we refer to 'process' as incorporating 
two aspects; development and implementation.  Essentially three parties have the 
potential to influence the development and implementation of trust pay and 
conditions: management, unions and employees.  The complex ways in which these 
parties interrelate were important variables in pay modernisation programmes, 
whether or not trusts departed from national arrangements, minimally or radically.  
Our data revealed a number of managerial approaches which could be adopted.  These 
approaches highlighted how unions may or may not have been involved and where 
they were involved, such involvement varied.  Management may:  
 
• adopt a unilateral approach whereby there is no union involvement, 
• liaise with employees directly both as individuals and through the use of focus 
groups, 
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• liaise with employees indirectly through the use of external consultancy firms, 
• hold discussions with the unions, 
• negotiate with the unions, and/or 
• adopt one, some, or all of these approaches.   
 
The complexity of the situation was further confounded as management could adopt 
one, some, or all of these approaches in both the development and/or the 
implementation of trust pay systems.  Moreover, our data suggested that an array of 
associated aspects, for example the use of management consultants, the degree of staff 
involvement and/or duration of time between initiation and implementation of trust 
pay, also had the potential to influence process.  Although this sub-section 
predominantly focuses on management approaches, it is important to remember that 
unions may decline to liaise with management.  Each case study differed.  We now 
use a selection of these case studies to illustrate pertinent points.  
2.3.4.1  Union involvement 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the degree of union involvement in each trust.  Essentially, there 
were three categories:  
 
i) where there was negotiation and agreement on the new pay system and also 
on subsequent pay increases;  
ii) where the unions were involved in discussions on the development of the pay 
scheme, but there was no agreement. Once the scheme was introduced, 
however, there was joint negotiation and agreement on subsequent pay 
increases;  
iii) where the unions were not involved in developing the scheme but negotiated 
and agreed pay increases once the scheme was introduced. 
  
It is notable that the degree of union involvement had no apparent influence on 
whether radical or minimal changes were introduced.  For example, at both 
Multiservice 1 and Urban 1 radical changes were introduced but at the former there 
was little union involvement and at the latter there was union agreement, (see figure 
2.3).  
 
Focusing on the range of managerial approaches that could be adopted, table 2.6 
reveals that in all but two trusts (Acute Teaching 1 and Multiservice 1), there was at 
least discussion between management and unions prior to a new pay system being 
introduced.  At Acute Teaching 1, according to management, the unions declined to 
take part in discussions, even on a 'need to know' basis so that they could advise their 
members.  
  
At Multiservice 1, which had a competency based grading system, the unions were 
not invited to take part in the development of the system.  This was undertaken by a 
consultancy firm (Lloyd Masters).  The unions, however, signed a recognition 
agreement and subsequently negotiated the pay increase for staff on trust terms.  At 
Very Large Acute 2, the unions' rationale for engaging in discussion was to influence 
the final model.  At Community an interesting situation occurred.  The unions did not 
support the development of the new pay arrangements mainly because they were of 
the view that the job evaluation system used, Medequate, did not adequately value the 
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role of clinicians.  Nevertheless, they later reached a compromise with management 
whereby employees on trust contracts prior to the new pay system being launched, 
could opt to remain on Whitley terms, rather than automatically receiving the new 
trust terms. 
 
Figure 2.3: Degree of union involvement by trust 
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Table 2.6: Process by trust 
 
Trust Focus groups Management 
consultants 
Discussion with 
unions 
Agreement with 
unions 
 
Acute Teaching 1 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
Acute Teaching 2  
 
√  
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Acute Teaching 3 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
Community 
 
√ 
 
√  
 
√ 
 
x 
 
Large Acute 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Multiservice 1 
 
x 
 
√  
 
x 
 
x 
 
Multiservice 2 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Multiservice 3 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Very Large  Acute 1 
 
  √ a
 
  √ a
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Very Large Acute 2 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
a With nurses, midwives and HCAs (Urban 1) 
 
 
At Acute Teaching 2, in respect of the theatres agreement, the trade unions were 
involved at two main levels.  First, discussions took place within the forum of the 
general bargaining group and through the staff side chair.  Second, at departmental 
level, the Unison representative liaised closely with both the staff and the staff side 
chair. Indeed, both union representatives and management considered trade union 
involvement at Acute Teaching 2 critical to success.  One management interviewee, 
commenting on the union representative in theatres, remarked:  
 
He went to every meeting there was about pay.  He was taken seriously.  His concerns were 
taken seriously.  I think that is reflected in the amount of people who actually came over on to 
the pay scale. 
 
Notably, implementation at Acute Teaching 2 also included a one-year pilot project in 
theatres. 
 
Interestingly, at Large Acute a union representative was instrumental in developing 
the pay scheme for clinical support workers (CSWs).  Against a backdrop of 
recruitment and retention difficulties in nursing, CSWs (previously called auxiliaries) 
were undertaking a range of additional duties.  This led to Unison supporting an 
appeal for a number of staff to be regraded from grade A to grade B.  Immediately 
prior to the hearing, the union official suggested that a working party be set up to 
obviate the need for appeals and properly reward CSWs for additional duties 
undertaken. The then assistant director of nursing, who accepted that CSWs were 
taking on new responsibilities, subsequently accepted this suggestion. Thus, the move 
to new arrangements stemmed directly from a union proposal. 
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2.3.4.2  Management consultants 
 
Turning to the use of management consultants, these were commissioned in five of 
our ten case study trusts (see 2.6).  Our data revealed that the role of the management 
consultants differed from trust to trust. It could range from investigating staff views 
about pay and their jobs and making recommendations, as KPMG did at Acute 
Teaching 3, Hay did at Urban 1 and Towers Perrin did at Community, to developing a 
competency system, as Lloyd Masters did at Large Acute and Multiservice 1. 
2.3.4.3  Staff involvement 
 
Staff involvement primarily occurred through the use of focus groups, which may or 
may not have been facilitated by management consultants.  Focus groups were held 
with or without management consultants in five trusts (see 2.6).  Staff involvement 
took a number of forms: 
 
• suggestions about the future shape of the pay agreement, 
• helping to formulate and compile competencies, 
• communications with management individually about their pay if they were to 
move over to a new system.  
 
For example, at Acute Teaching 3 staff, through focus groups, suggested changes to 
the pay system. At Acute Teaching 2, groups of theatre staff met with management to 
draw up competencies. At Urban 1, a manager and a union representative conducted 
interviews jointly with each member of staff individually to explain how their position 
would change under a new pay system. 
2.3.4.4  Time 
 
Our data revealed that the duration of time between initiation to implementation of 
trust pay varied between our case studies, as mentioned in sub-section 2.2.2.  At 
Acute Teaching 3 the trust wanted to proceed slowly. As one interviewee remarked: 
 
You know if it’s limited to one or two service centres and it all goes pear shaped, it’s much 
easier to control the damage; but if it’s rolled out and if it affects every nurse, midwife and 
health visitor employed by the trust then it’s quite difficult to control that damage and actually 
to bring that back in and it would have a negative effect on confidence in the employer. 
 
Roll-out, however, took much longer than anticipated due to a protracted period of 
staff training in competency based appraisal and the initial project leader leaving. At 
Acute Teaching 2 too, there was some time between initiation and implementation. In 
1995 there was a trust wide job evaluation exercise. For a number of reasons, 
including cost and change of government, it was decided to roll out gradually and the 
first staffing department to receive trust terms was theatres, in January 1998.  In other 
trusts, implementation occurred much more rapidly.  For example Multiservice 1 
gained trust status in 1993 and launched a new pay system in 1994.  
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2.3.5 Costs 
This sub-section initially focuses on stakeholder perceptions and then goes on to 
discuss developmental costs, assimilation costs and on-going costs.  It must be noted, 
however, that costs were affected by the extent of the changes made to the national 
arrangements, for example whether the development of the trust system involved 
radical or minimal changes. Costs were also affected by the extent of staff covered by 
the new system, for example whether applicable to one, some or all non-medical 
occupational groups.  In addition, our data revealed that other factors had a bearing on 
costs, such as whether additional funds were available to support the development and 
implementation of trust pay arrangements, the extent of the incentive payments 
offered to induce staff to transfer to trust terms and whether trusts obtained offsetting 
cost savings. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that fear of incurring costs could be an impediment to 
change. Two trusts eschewed major changes to pay (Large Acute and Multiservice 3) 
because of an unwillingness to risk an increase in costs. Also three trusts which 
originally intended to apply a new pay system to all non-medical staff decided to 
restrict it to discrete groups only, largely because of cost pressures. 
2.3.5.1 Stakeholder perceptions 
 
In many trusts, the unions were of the view that a new pay system had been 
introduced to obtain paybill savings.  For instance at Urban 1 a union representative 
interviewed suggested that pay reform was ‘very much linked to money… a long term 
objective to save money’.  Similarly at Multiservice 1 the unions were firmly of the 
view that the new pay system saved the trust money.  (Management in neither trust, 
however, stated that as one of their aims; see sub-section 2.2.2).  Reduced costs may 
have flowed from reductions in overtime pay or unsocial hours payments but these 
reductions were offset by higher basic pay.  Indeed a management interviewee’s 
comments at Acute Teaching 2 were not untypical. He said: ‘It’s been generally 
accepted… that it wasn’t about saving money. It was about bringing more modern 
practices into the pay system.’ 
2.3.5.2 Development costs 
 
It was difficult to establish exact resource and/or financial costs in respect of the 
management time involved in development of new pay systems as none of the trusts 
we studied quantified this information precisely, but all relevant interviewees made 
general remarks.  For example, one commented:  
 
Over the time, we have had two or three people working on the project at different times and 
each of them at different levels and working different hours. 
 
Another interviewee remarked: 
 
You need the time of trade union reps. You need the expertise of union reps, you need 
motivated knowledgeable trade union reps and they need to put a hell of a lot of time in and that 
can have quite an impact. You can virtually lose a whole time equivalent for a protracted period 
in the trade union role and if they are not knowledgeable and motivated, you have a real 
problem.  In management time again what you need is somebody who has the understanding 
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and motivation to do this and also has the capacity in their working day to commit to this 
because of course they still have their day job. 
 
What was revealed by our data was that the management time incurred in developing 
a bespoke trust pay system could be extensive.  The pay system for nurses and 
midwives at Urban 1 entailed 'an investment of more than 500 person hours', 
according to a report by the then HR director.  At Acute Teaching 2 a report to the 
trust board remarked that resources for the development and introduction of the 
theatres pay scheme included ‘… project meetings lasting 32 hours in total, plus 
management, personnel and management accountant's time outside of these 
meetings’. This same report also suggested that whilst no extra staff were taken on, 
the project manager's time equated to, on average, one day a week over a year. In 
contrast, other organisations employed additional staff to assist with the development 
and implementation of the trust pay system: three trusts introduced a full-time post. 
  
In respect of sums dispersed in development, again our data was incomplete, perhaps 
because of commercial confidentiality.  Where trusts employed management 
consultants, they did not reveal the payments involved. ‘Pump priming' money was 
given by the NHS Executive to Acute Teaching 3 and Urban 1 who received around 
£70,000 and £80,000 respectively, according to interviewees. At Acute Teaching 2 
the trust centrally provided £30,000 to 'pump prime' the theatre pilot project; equating 
to 1.1% of the theatres’ paybill. 
 
Development costs were broken down into four areas: the development of the pay 
system, the briefing of staff, the development of the competencies or attributes 
determining pay progression and the training of managers in competency/performance 
appraisal. Trusts, when providing some albeit limited information about development 
costs, were normally unable to provide further breakdowns. Where trusts introduced 
pay systems, however, HR and/or line managers saw each member of staff 
individually to explain their personal pay position both under Whitley and the trust 
pay system. Such an interview lasted generally half an hour. Unusually in respect of 
nurses and midwives at Urban 1 a HR manager and a union representative jointly 
carried out the interview with the member of staff. Such interview costs were 
absorbed by management. Also management absorbed training costs in the general 
training budget. As to the development of competencies, sometimes a consultant was 
used, as at Multiservice 1 and Large Acute and sometimes the cost of development 
was absorbed by the line manager as for theatres at Acute Teaching 2.   
2.3.5.3  Assimilation costs 
 
Assimilation costs varied. There were no assimilation costs at Acute Teaching 3, 
where national pay points were followed and at Multiservice 1, where the new pay 
system did not have pay points. An interviewee told us that assimilation costs for 
Acute Teaching 1 were calculated at £540,000 in 1994/95 in respect of all eligible 
staff.  At Urban 1, nursing and midwifery staff received two increments, (worth 2% 
each) on transfer, with a further increment if the transfer took place in the first month 
of the new pay system. It was suggested that the new arrangements resulted in a very 
slight increase in the nursing paybill, in part due to the costs of assimilation.  At 
Multiservice 2, where the assimilation costs equated to 3.5% of the paybill, some 
theatre staff received increases of around £1,000 per year.  An interviewee who 
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remarked, ‘My memory is that people were pretty happy as their wages went up’ 
corroborated this. 
 
Very Large Acute 2 informed the researchers that overall there were no assimilation 
costs because starters who commenced at lower salaries were balanced by staff 
transferring to the new system. Two trusts (Acute Teaching 1, Large Acute) said that 
assimilation costs had to be absorbed into the departmental budget, through efficiency 
savings which could involve changes in skill mix and reductions in premium 
payments. For instance, at Large Acute the cost of introducing the CSW pay deal was 
equivalent to the loss of 15 whole time equivalent D grades.  Because D grade 
vacancies exceeded that number, this was notional.  Indeed, a management 
interviewee remarked: 
 
I couldn’t recruit Ds [qualified nurses] because the students just weren’t coming through…So 
when we actually changed, I had quite a lot of vacancies and could move the money quite 
easily. What we said is we’ve got 10 As who need to go up to B. Finance looked at the money 
and agreed that we had got D grade money in there and changed that down. It means you recruit 
less Ds, but I couldn’t recruit in the first place. 
2.3.5.4  On-going paybill costs 
 
On-going paybill costs were difficult to quantify as trusts conducted little or no 
evaluation (see sub-section 2.3.6).  Scrutiny of the limited data available to us 
revealed that on-going paybill costs ranged widely.  Savings of £60,000 were reported 
at Multiservice 3, where the introduction of a 'continuous process pattern' (CPP) 
agreement changed working patterns for laboratory staff. Minimal savings were 
reported at Very Large Acute 2 and no savings were made at Acute Teaching 3, where 
changes to the pay structure were minimal.  
 
At Multiservice 1, where there were no grade maxima only grade minima, an 
interviewee was of the view that the pay bill was ‘probably slightly higher’ under the 
trust’s pay system: an estimated 20% of the workforce had gone ‘off scale’ ie were 
receiving higher pay than the equivalent Whitley maximum. There was a 'healthy 
turnover' of staff, however, and part of the performance pay award was in the form of 
a non-consolidated bonus and thus recyclable money.  A further interviewee, 
however, remarked that if it had not been for the Agenda for Change proposals, the 
trust might have considered renegotiating its pay system because ‘I don’t think very 
long term it would be viable’. 
 
Managers at Acute Teaching 1 and Acute Teaching 2 said that increases in basic 
salaries for staff were offset by savings from overtime and unsocial hours payments. 
Also three trusts specifically reported savings from management/payroll 
administration. For instance the finance director at Very Large Acute 2, said that since 
the introduction of their single pay spine in 1994, the number of staff employed by the 
trust had increased by 30-40% but the number of payroll staff had remained constant. 
The finance director at Multiservice 1 said that the new pay system had resulted in 
‘far less’ payroll costs, though she was not sure how much was attributable to the new 
pay system and how much to new working practices in payroll. At Large Acute the 
new pay arrangements for maintenance craftsmen and staff in Central Sterile Services 
Department resulted not only in savings on overtime and unsocial hours payments, 
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but also in the saving of management time through the removal of clocking on and the 
transfer of staff from weekly pay to monthly pay. At Community, where overall the 
paybill increased by 1%, the new, simpler pay system had led to administrative 
savings. The finance director said: 
 
Rather than having this complex system of people claiming different premium rates whether 
they are working Saturday or Sunday or late during the week they are assimilated to just one 
scale which compensates them for that regardless… So it’s much simpler for managers. It’s 
much easier to administer. 
 
On the other hand, the new pay systems all of which included an element of 
performance pay led to an increase in management time in appraising staff, at least 
one hour per employee. A manager at Multiservice 1 commented that appraisal 
‘would slip in a busy environment, but because it’s related to pay you’re all very 
careful to get them done for everybody’. No trust, however, had either calculated on a 
financial basis the costs in management time or the savings in management time 
mentioned above. 
 
Table 2.7 pulls together our data but it should be noted that the data provided to us 
were neither comprehensive, nor in the same format from trust to trust.  
 
2.3.6 Evaluation 
It is not our intention here to provide comprehensive results of every evaluation to 
which we refer. This is dealt with in sub-section 2.3.7 on outcomes. Rather, this sub-
section outlines the different ways in which evaluation was conducted, reports on the 
different parties, internal and external, that took part in evaluation and outlines the 
diverse foci of trusts' evaluation. 
 
We were surprised at the paucity of evaluation.  For example, at Acute Teaching 1 in 
the original briefing to the board the HR director said:  
 
It is essential that the introduction of new pay and conditions be closely monitored to 
ensure they are operationally appropriate and viable. Applying them in a piece-meal 
fashion to coincide with the re-engineering “roll out” provides the opportunity to closely 
monitor small and manageable segments of the organisation enabling swift corrective 
action to be taken when seen to be necessary (HR director, 1994). 
 
Nevertheless, in the event Acute Teaching 1 did not undertake any formal evaluation, 
apart from monitoring the numbers who were on the trust pay system. Furthermore, 
trust figures on sickness absence and labour turnover were sometimes inadequate; see 
sub-section 2.3.7.4. This was somewhat surprising given that in some trusts, the 
resources necessary to develop and implement trust pay systems were extensive; (see 
sub-sections 2.3.5.2 and 2.3.5.4).  Also, whilst the NHS Executive now requires trusts 
to conduct annual staff attitude surveys, the detail is determined at trust level. Our 
data revealed that these surveys tended to focus on a variety of issues, including pay 
levels but did not examine employee attitudes to pay systems and, as with other trust 
statistics, did not distinguish between those on trust terms and those on Whitley. 
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 Table 2.7: Costs of introducing new pay system by trust 
Trust Staff group Development costs Assimilation costs On-going paybill costs ie after offsetting savings 
Community      
Acute Teaching 1 Non-medical staff except 
scientists, estates officers 
pharmacists 
Absorbed by existing HR staff 
and line managers 
£540,000 Costs absorbed by departments 
Acute Teaching 2 All theatre staff Absorbed by existing HR staff 
and line managers 
1.1% of paybill Not known but savings on overtime pay & sickness 
absence 
Acute Teaching 3 Nurses Consultants + full time post and 
other costs absorbed by HR 
staff and line managers 
National pay points 
observed 
Less than 2% 
Community  All non-medical staff  
except certain clinical 
psychologists 
Consultants + full-time post One increment 
(4% basic pay) 
1% costs 
Large Acute CSWs 
 
 
 
Maintenance 
craftsmen 
 
 
Absorbed by existing HR staff 
and by line managers.  
National pay points 
observed 
 
 
 
Not known 
Costs absorbed by departments with loss of posts. 
 
 
 
Costs offset by savings from abolishing clocking, 
overtime, call-out payments & weekly pay. 
Multiservice 1 All non-medical staff Consultant + full-time post with 
other costs absorbed by HR and 
line managers  
None ‘Probably slightly higher’: an estimated 20% of 
population above equivalent Whitley scale maximum. 
Multiservice 2 Qualified 
theatre staff 
Absorbed by existing  HR staff 
and line manager 
Up to 3.5%  of 
paybill 
Not known but some offsetting savings 
Multiservice 3 Certain laboratory staff N/A N/A N/A 
Urban 1 Nurses Consultant + 500 person hours 
absorbed by existing HR staff 
and line managers  
4% of basic pay + 
2% incentive to 
change immediately 
A very slight increase 
Very Large Acute 2 All non-medical staff Absorbed by existing HR staff 
and line managers. 
None: those moving 
across balanced by 
starters recruited on 
less attractive 
packages. 
Minimal savings 
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Only one of our case study trusts, Multiservice 3, went beyond an in-house survey. It 
was part of a consortium of 38 trusts in the north of England that commissioned 
Electoral Reform Ballot Services to carry out a staff opinion survey. Thus it was able 
to benchmark its findings against those of other trusts in the area (Electoral Reform 
Ballot Services, 2000). In short then, evaluation was limited. Where evaluation took 
place, however, it could be divided into internal and external evaluation. Dealing first 
with internal evaluation, ie evaluation conducted by the trust, at Community there was 
an audit of the performance development review system among community nurses in 
1999. At Acute Teaching 3 a formal review of the pilot of the competency based pay 
system was undertaken (Stern, 1997) but it focused mainly on the effects of the pay 
system on recruitment. According to the HR director ‘we were not evaluating in the 
sense of setting it against costed alternatives’.  At Multiservice 2, where an interim 
audit of the theatres' pay system was conducted, the primary focus was the changes 
which had occurred in working practices.  
 
In contrast to these relatively limited evaluations, Urban 1 carried out an extensive 
evaluation of its performance pay system two years after its introduction. The data 
were obtained from a range of sources including a questionnaire survey, individual 
interviews and focus groups. In addition there was an analysis of the performance 
payments made to ascertain if there was any bias on grounds of gender and ethnicity. 
As a result Urban 1 made some changes. 
 
Other trusts combined internal and external evaluation. This was exemplified at Acute 
Teaching 2 where an MBA student examined staff attitudes towards the theatres' pay 
system and the HR director examined the managerial benefits of the system. The latter 
included the effects of the trust system on recruitment and retention of staff, rostering 
and expenditure.  Similarly, evaluation at Very Large Acute 2 also incorporated 
internal and external reviews, the former consisting of an in-house evaluation of the 
impact of its pay system 18 months after it had been introduced. The external 
evaluation consisted of an examination of the effects of performance pay on employee 
motivation, conducted by a university. Another trust to combine internal and external 
evaluation was Multiservice 1.  In 1995 the trust conducted an evaluation of their 
performance pay system based on responses from 42 employees which indicated a 
number of concerns (see section 3.4.7) and in 1996 a university investigated the 
effects of performance pay on employee motivation.  
2.3.7 Outcomes 
We now turn to the outcomes of trust pay systems. We first discuss the parties who 
have a stake in the outcomes. Then we look at working practices, employment data 
and the outcomes for patients. Finally we consider the views of staff and unions. 
2.3.7.1 The stakeholders 
 
There are four main stakeholders in the outcomes of changes to NHS pay and grading 
systems: management, unions, employees and patients. The different stakeholders 
have different priorities. For instance a management priority is likely to be the extent 
to which a pay system is cost effective and supports functional or temporal flexibility, 
whereas a union priority is likely to centre on the level of pay and the transparency 
and equity of a pay system. This is a priority shared by employees, who may also 
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favour stability in earnings. The link between pay systems and patients is the most 
problematic.  Whilst patient care is influenced by the dynamics between management, 
unions and employees, there is no obvious and direct causal relationship between 
these variables.  As one HR director said, patient care is probably ‘one step removed’ 
and another HR director said that changes to pay systems ‘facilitate, but do not 
deliver’ changes to the provision of health services.  Given the differing approaches of 
stakeholders, we look in turn at working practices, patient outcomes and then staff 
and union attitudes on the fairness of the system.  We deal first with working 
practices. 
2.3.7.2 Working practices: temporal flexibility 
 
Trusts have been concerned to reduce the number of staff on permanent nights and 
introduce rotating shifts for a number of reasons. First permanent nights attract 
expensive unsocial hours premia under the national arrangements but many 
interviewees expressed a view that those on day shifts work harder and had more 
complex jobs than those on permanent nights but were paid less. (Trusts only deal 
with emergency procedures at night and in the main night staff ‘baby-sit’, an 
interviewee claimed.) Second, those on permanent nights miss out on developmental 
and training opportunities and third they are often divorced from the main 
management chain.  
 
Reductions in permanent night work can be secured under Whitley, for instance 
putting new staff on rotating shift contracts or obtaining agreement to variation in 
contract. As detailed in sub-section 2.3.2.3, however, a number of trusts took the 
opportunity of changes to pay to introduce rotating shifts. For instance, our research 
showed that three of our 10 trusts (Acute Teaching 2 in respect of staff in theatres 
only, Community and Very Large Acute 2) paid inclusive rates dependant on the 
flexibility provided, with the highest inclusive rate for those on rotating shifts. 
 
We were informed that the new roster system at Acute Teaching 2, underpinned by an 
inclusive rate payment system, provided a better match than hitherto with service 
needs. It led to fewer operations being cancelled, a significant reduction in the waiting 
list and emergency work after midnight limited to critical operations only. 
Nevertheless, there were disadvantages with an inclusive rate system. For instance, a 
focus group of nurses at Community suggested that a degree of inflexibility had been 
introduced into staff deployment. As a ward manager said: 
 
If you have someone on flexi 1 [basic + 8%] … if you want them to do say a week on nights, 
it’s impossible really to get any night money because they’re on a flexi 1 contract. 
 
Another disadvantage of inclusive rates was identified by a management interviewee 
at Community who was of the view that they tempted some individuals to take longer 
off sick.  She said: 
 
Before if you were off for a month you missed out all your allowances, whereas now you get the 
same amounts, so instead of taking one week and thinking well I’m losing money, people 
maybe take two or three. 
 
Her view, however, was not borne out by an analysis of sickness statistics; (see sub-
section 2.3.7.4).   
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We noted above (this sub-section) that changes to shift systems can be made 
irrespective of changes to pay and we came across experiments in self-rostering where 
pay changes had not been made, eg oncology at Acute Teaching 2. Brooks (2000:26) 
argues that self-rostering lessens the detrimental effects of shiftwork for employees, 
while service needs can be met provided that ‘there are sufficient checks in place’. 
Also we found that changes to hours of work for PAMs had been made with and 
without changes to pay systems. For instance at Community the new inclusive rates 
supported evening working by occupational therapists (though a focus group of PAMs 
were not aware of that provision).  At Acute Teaching 3, the opening hours of certain 
physiotherapy out-patient clinics had been extended and physiotherapists, who 
remained on Whitley, worked longer hours on some days and in return had a half day 
off a week. 
 
A second important way that trusts can obtain temporal flexibility and at the same 
time control paybill costs is by rationalising the on-call arrangements. For instance 
Multiservice 3 changed the on-call system for certain pathology departments through 
a continuous process pattern (CPP) agreement (see 2.3.2.3), albeit within the 
flexibility provided under Whitley. The departmental manager was of the view that 
CPP worked well, while employees said that although ‘CPP is not perfect, it’s the best 
we’ve got’. 
 
In theatres at Multiservice 2, a new shift system was introduced during the day, with 
unsocial hours premia for weekday work incorporated into basic pay and on-call was 
substituted for night duty.  According to the theatre manager:  
 
The absence of the ‘convenience factor’ of having night duty staff has reduced the incidence of 
inappropriate surgery during the night. The downside of the on-call service is that occasionally 
an elective list has to be cancelled because the emergency team has worked through the previous 
night, thereby reducing staffing levels on the following day (Shannon, 1999:571). 
 
In short, eight of our 10 trusts introduced rotating shifts and/or new on-call 
arrangements or annual hours underpinned by new pay systems and managers were of 
the view that this enabled them to meet service needs more efficiently and effectively. 
2.3.7.3 Working practices: functional flexibility 
 
The main area where the pay system was used to support functional flexibility was in 
theatres, whether or not as part of trust wide pay changes. Leaving aside Community 
which did not have theatres, six out of the remaining nine trusts specifically changed 
terms and conditions in theatres. The main aim was to support the multi-skilling of 
ODAs/ODPs and theatre nurses against a background of a national shortage of the 
latter and to reward the skills of the former so that their pay would equate with that of 
theatre nurses with whom, with training, they were to a large extent interchangeable. 
(Under Whitley ODAs/ODPs fall within the Professional and Technical B Council, 
not the Nursing and Midwifery Staff Council.)  Pay apart, management interviewees 
regarded the harmonisation of working hours and overtime/unsocial hours premia as 
particularly important in underpinning functional flexibility. 
 
The changes in terms and conditions so that ODAs/ODPs and theatre nurses were 
placed on a common footing, however, could only support functional flexibility, not 
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deliver it. Delivery can only be secured by the necessary training: eg nurse training in 
anaesthetics and ODAs/ODPs in scrubbing up and recovery. Training is dependent on 
staff release, which had led to problems at Multiservice 2, hampering the achievement 
of multi-skilling. Nevertheless there and at Acute Teaching 2, the changes to the pay 
system were considered by management to have been essential catalysts. For instance 
a management interviewee at Acute Teaching 2 said: 
 
I don’t think we could have taken it quite as far as we did without equal reward for equal 
contribution…. Before the change basically ODPs had one coffee room and nurses had another. 
That’s going. It’s not completely gone. 
 
A union interviewee also thought that the new pay system had led to the breaking 
down of demarcations. After the pay changes, she said: 
 
One wasn’t getting more pay for being on-call. One wasn’t getting more overtime payment. 
They were all getting annual leave at the same rate and basically it meant that they could work 
alongside not looking to say, you have got more than I have got. 
 
Theatres apart, another area of multi-skilling in our case studies was in respect of 
support workers at Large Acute where clinical support workers (CSWs) who acquired 
and demonstrated certain skills moved from grade A to grade B automatically. 
 
A number of trusts had created new posts, eg 'ward hostesses' at Very Large Acute 2 
(whose responsibilities include making beds, serving meals, basic patient 
administration and simple maintenance work such as changing light bulbs) and 
'discharge co-ordinators' at Large Acute. At Very Large Acute 2, the new post was 
‘Medequated’ and slotted into the pay spine relatively easily and quickly, whereas 
under Whitley personnel ‘would have scratched [their] heads’ as to whether it was an 
administrative or ancillary post. At Large Acute, however, where there was no trust- 
wide job evaluation system, the grading of the post was more problematic. At the time 
of the fieldwork, a post-holder complained that she had already been waiting many 
months for her grade to be allocated. 
2.3.7.4 Employment data 
 
This sub-section is based on data collected from the trusts in this study. We 
endeavoured to see how and, if so, in what way changes in pay systems had affected 
certain employment data. We found that exit interview data were not always kept 
centrally for the whole organisation.  In some trusts it was collected and held by 
department/directorate heads, while in other trusts it was only collected for those 
departments/directorates where a problem had been identified. 
 
In short, there were only a few trusts where we were able to locate useful exit 
interview data.  At Community, the percentage of staff citing pay as a major factor in 
their decision to leave the trust almost halved in 1998/99 compared to 1996/97 (from 
approximately 25% to 12%). According to a report to the board in 1999, that ‘could 
be a reflection of the satisfaction with trust pay’. At Multiservice 1, where a new pay 
structure was launched in 1994, exit interview data were examined for three periods 
(April-September 1996; October-March 1996/97; April-September 1999).  There 
appeared to have been a slight increase in respondents claiming that trust pay was 
poor between 1996 and 1999.  No data prior to 1996 was available and no distinction 
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was made between staff on Whitley and staff on trust pay, so it was difficult to 
establish the effect of the introduction of the new pay system. 
 
Bearing in mind that there are many factors, apart from pay, which contribute to 
recruitment and retention and bearing in mind that labour turnover data reflects pay 
levels, rather than pay systems, we then looked at the effect of new pay systems on 
labour turnover. We could not draw any conclusions on a cross case basis. This was 
because data was not comparable between trusts due to the varying range of local 
initiatives that had been introduced by trusts; the different staff groups focused upon 
by trusts and the different methods of data collection adopted by trusts.  
 
We then sought to see if we could draw conclusions from the labour turnover data in 
respect of a trust individually. We found that we were unable to do so. In none of the 
trusts studied did labour turnover data distinguish between those on Whitley and those 
on the trust pay system. Moreover, the data were often deficient in at least one other 
respect: 
 
• Data did not longitudinally examine labour-force aspects by staff group before 
and after the introduction of trust pay systems. 
 
• Data did not distinguish by staff group, even where pay changes had been 
introduced for selective groups of employees only, eg theatre staff. 
 
• Data was incomplete/sporadic, covering intermittent time periods that were not 
comparable with each other. 
 
• Data related to very short time periods post the introduction of a new pay system, 
because a trust had only recently introduced new pay arrangements. 
 
For instance, at Large Acute new pay arrangements for clinical support workers and 
midwives were only introduced in 1999, so a clear pattern had not yet emerged.  At 
Acute Teaching 3 too, because of the slow roll-out which had only just been 
completed for qualified nursing and midwifery staff by the time of the fieldwork 
(June/July 2000), labour turnover data were of limited use. At Very Large Acute 1 it 
was not possible to separate out labour turnover and sickness absence figures for its 
two components (Urban 1 and Urban 2) post merger, ie 1998, though terms and 
conditions at the two hospitals remained distinct. 
 
Given these important caveats, particularly the lack of distinction between Whitley 
staff and trust paid staff, we looked at labour turnover data where trusts provided 
fairly comprehensive statistics. We found that the new pay systems did not seem to 
have had any noticeable positive or negative long-term effects on turnover rates.  At 
Community the new pay system was introduced from 1 July1996 and had no apparent 
effect on labour turnover: from 1997-99 the average rate was 14 % compared to an 
average of 15% between 1993-95. At Very Large Acute 2 labour turnover also 
remained fairly static and varied by under four percentage points from 1993 to 2000. 
At March 1993, ie a year before the trust pay system was introduced, labour turnover 
stood at 10.9%.  By March 2000 it was 13.3%.  Between those dates there were 
fluctuations with the highest point being reached in March 1995 (14.5%).  
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Labour turnover data for nurses and midwives at Urban 1 was examined from 1993/4, 
ie the year before the new pay system was introduced, until 1996/97, ie just before the 
merger with Urban 2. The data show that labour turnover for Urban 1 nurses and 
midwives in 1993/94 was 12.3%, rising to 16.7%% in 1995/96 and then falling back 
to 12.8% in 1996/97. In short, labour turnover data showed fluctuations and thus no 
evidence of positive or negative changes being associated with the introduction of the 
new pay system in 1994.  
 
As to theatres at Multiservice 2, two years before the new pay system was introduced 
for clinically qualified staff, labour turnover was 13.2% (1995/96) and 6.1% 
(1996/97).  In the year immediately following the introduction of the new pay regime 
(1997/98) labour turnover reduced to nil. The following year it rose to 6.1% and the 
year after to 13.6%. In Acute Teaching 2, where a new pay system was implemented 
in January 1998, we were told that labour turnover in theatres in 1998/99 was about 
5% but had increased to 9.9% in 1999/2000.  A management interviewee, however, 
was of the view that this was ‘not because of pay. I think that it is connected to the 
way we have reorganised theatres’. At Multiservice 1 some data relating to the period 
from April 1996 (ie two years after the introduction of the pay system) was available.  
This showed a span of just over three percentage points between 1996/97 and 
1999/2000 (22.4% to 19.1%).  
 
Although Acute Teaching 3 labour turnover data were not useful for our purposes, we 
obtained some information on the results of a pilot of the pay system. A review found 
that three out of 13 respondents in the Children and Women’s Services and five out of 
27 respondents in Cardiothoracic Services said that the trust’s competency based 
nurses’ pay system would positively influence their decision to apply for a post 
(Stern, 1997). 
 
We were not provided with sickness absence data for all our 10 trusts. Moreover, the 
extent to which and how pay and grading and sickness absence are related is 
debatable. For instance sickness absence varies seasonally, although the pay system 
does not, and is influenced by the policies and procedures for handling sickness 
absence. Leaving that debate aside, where the necessary data were provided, we found 
that in some trusts the introduction of the new pay system had gone hand in hand with 
a reduction in sickness absence. For instance at Acute Teaching 2 sickness absence 
was 5.3% in theatres in 1999-2000, compared with 7% before the new agreement was 
introduced in January 1998. At Community sickness absence was 3.1% in 1998/99 
compared to 3.5% in 1992/93. (Community’s new pay system was introduced in 
1996.) At Multiservice 2 sickness absence in theatres was 7.3% (1995/96) and 6.0% 
(1996/97). The year after the new theatres' pay system was introduced (1997/98) it 
fell to 3.7%. At Urban 2 we were given sickness absence data for Accident & 
Emergency and Trauma & Orthopaedics, where new pay systems were introduced in 
1996. In the year before the new pay arrangements were introduced sickness absence 
was 2.6% and 3.6% respectively. The comparable figures for 1997/1998 were 2.6% 
and 2.4% respectively, ie a downward trend in Trauma & Orthopaedics but not 
Accident & Emergency. These reductions, however, may be attributed to new 
approaches to sickness management as noted above (this sub-section), rather than new 
pay systems and, in any event, do not equate to a causal link between these two 
variables. 
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2.3.7.5 Patient outcomes 
 
Patient outcomes are affected indirectly by pay systems, for instance where they 
underpin temporal and functional flexibility (see sub-sections 2.3.7.2 and 2.3.7.3) and 
lead to improved service delivery and/or where they lead to improved staff 
performance. Accordingly, we first examined NHS performance indicator data 
(1998/99) in respect of our case study trusts. We then examined interview data from 
our management respondents. 
 
In short, the quantitative data did not allow us to find any positive or negative causal 
relationship between NHS performance indicators and innovations in pay and 
grading, because the performance indicators themselves were deficient for the 
purposes of this study. Although the indicators compared like with like, eg 
multiservice trusts with multiservice trusts and acute teaching trusts with acute 
teaching trusts, their development is only in its infancy. Also, 'differences may occur 
between hospitals due to the differing mix of specialities' and 'death rates may vary 
between trusts due to the variation in the complexity of procedures carried out.  For 
example, the major cardiac centres may have high death rates due to the complexity 
of the operations carried out' (NHS Executive, 2000: 65-67). Furthermore, none of the 
trusts in this study made changes to the pay of medical staff, yet their work was a 
major influence on these indicators. With these important caveats in mind, we looked 
at the league tables of both emergency re-admissions and deaths following surgery. 
These indicators applied to all our case study trusts, except Community where there 
were no theatres and, unsurprisingly, we were unable to establish any relationship 
between the performance indicators and pay systems.  
 
Next we turned to our qualitative data and asked management interviewees about the 
inter-relationship between pay systems and patient care. In some trusts, interviewees 
were of the view that the inter-relationship was both tenuous and hard to identify. In 
other trusts, however, management was of the view that new pay systems had led to 
an improvement in patient care. For instance at Acute Teaching 1, the business 
process re-engineering (BPR) exercise, which in turn had led to the development of 
Acute Teaching 1’s pay system, had resulted in improved patient experiences, eg 
‘one-stop shops’ for a range of diagnostic tests. 
 
Moreover, managers in the trusts which had carried out some harmonisation were 
strongly of the view that harmonised pay systems supported teamwork across 
occupational boundaries. For instance, an interviewee at Acute Teaching 1 said that 
the change in pay and grading had been an aid to changing the culture of the hospital 
by stressing teamwork and breaking down professional boundaries. She contrasted 
Acute Teaching 1’s pay system with the Whitley grading systems, which reinforced 
professional boundaries between the many occupational groups in the NHS. Such a 
comment was not untypical. At Large Acute an interviewee said: 
 
It’s the old chestnut about having everyone in boxes… If we’re talking about teamworking, 
about being all in this together, it’s got to be more harmony for conditions of service. 
 
As table 2.5 above indicates, however, trusts either did not harmonise any terms or 
conditions or harmonised more than one. Accordingly managers were unable to link 
the harmonisation of a particular term with teamworking. Their comments were made 
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in respect of a package. Moreover, managers in four out of our 10 trusts which did not 
carry out harmonisation did not consider that the pay system effected teamworking 
either positively or negatively. 
 
Most managers were also of the view that a pay progression system based on 
performance/competence had beneficial outcomes for patient care. Thus, at Acute 
Teaching 2 the theatre manager considered that the competency based pay 
progression system had led to improvements in standards of dress and behaviour to 
patients, ‘just little things that are probably quite unquantifiable really’. At Large 
Acute a manager was of the view that the competency based pay scheme for clinical 
support workers (CSWs) had contributed to an improvement in standards of health 
care. Nevertheless, she added a rider, remarking that the competency based pay 
system ‘will only be as good as the kind of appraisal that sits within it…You’ll find a 
lot of managers not wanting to rock the boat unless they’ve got a particularly poor 
performer’. This interviewee was not the only manager who harboured doubts about 
the operation of performance pay. A manager at Multiservice 1 said that although she 
thought that ‘the ethos behind performance related pay is good… how people are 
judged on their performance and then money is attached to it, there are issues there’. 
 
At Acute Teaching 3, a manager felt that the new pay progression system had resulted 
in staff becoming more focused on their roles and his conversations with patients and 
students indicated that this was positive. On the other hand a PAMs manager at Acute 
Teaching 3, whose staff did not have a competency based system, was more sceptical. 
She said: ‘if there’d been a lot of positive vibes [from the nursing competency system] 
then I’m sure we’d have looked more strongly to see whether we could do it…We’d 
need to see very clear benefits from it to spend time away from doing the clinical 
work.’ 
2.3.7.6 Staff views 
 
Our data on staff views is drawn from focus groups which were not conducted in 
every trust (see table 2.3) and, where relevant, staff surveys. Staff experiences varied 
depending on their occupational group and the trust's pay system. Accordingly, it was 
not possible to provide a blanket assessment of their views.   
 
Staff views fell into two main categories: their views about the relationship between 
the pay system and patient care and their views about the fairness of the pay system 
per se. These two areas, although analytically distinct, in practice are not divorced 
from each other. For instance, morale and motivation relate, whether directly or 
indirectly, both to patient care and to views about the fairness of the system. 
 
We deal first with staffs’ views about patient care. On the positive side, at Large 
Acute qualified nurses said that the new competency based pay system for CSWs 
helped to ensure that they had trained support and enabled them to get teams together 
‘because we each know what we can do’. Another nurse said: 
 
A competency based pay system is a good thing. It should replace annual increments. You 
shouldn’t just sit back on your heels and just expect to get more pay for not performing or 
achieving. 
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At Acute Teaching 3 a nursing staff focus group was also generally positive. 
Comments included ‘brilliant, a framework to work towards’, ‘better than a job 
description… it tells you the qualities you need’. One thought it had motivated D 
grade nurses in her area; ‘people were a bit lazy before’. 
 
On the negative side competencies may impact negatively on mobility within the 
internal labour market. As a management interviewee at Acute Teaching 2 pointed 
out, an E grade nurse who wanted to transfer from a ward into theatres might not have 
the competencies required for theatres and, if so, could not immediately be offered 
pay at the level previously enjoyed.  
 
Urban 1's survey of its nurses, midwives and support staff in 1997 found that 44% 
were of the view that the new pay system had had a positive impact on patient care as 
opposed to 30% who disagreed and 26% who were either unsure or did not respond to 
that question. Moreover 45% were of the view that the new pay system had had a 
positive impact on staff motivation compared to 40% who did not. On the other hand, 
only 29% of respondents were of the view that it encouraged more flexible working. 
The survey, which presented rather contradictory findings, only had a 20% response 
rate, so the results should be treated with caution.  
 
A staff survey conducted by a university in 1996 at Multiservice 1 also had 
contradictory findings. For instance a bare majority (52%) thought that the individual 
performance and development review (IPDR) system had undermined staff morale 
but a similar majority (55%) thought that their performance rating was a fair 
reflection of their work. In the three focus groups at Multiservice 1 which we carried 
out in June 2000 we found that staff were virtually unanimously of the view that the 
IPDR system did not enhance employee morale. Focus group respondents wanted a 
guaranteed rise, not a performance related one. A typical comment was: 
 
If the nurse’s performance is poor, then it is up to the superior to pick it up and address that long 
before any performance appraisal at the end of the year or something. 
  
The difference between the university’s findings and our findings may reflect the 
difference in time or may be a product of methodological design.  The university’s 
findings were based on 693 responses to structured questionnaires, whereas our 
findings were based on responses derived from focus groups comprising some 20 
people in all, where participants were able to talk openly at some length. 
 
A study of staff views on the theatres' pay system by an MBA student at Acute 
Teaching 2 also revealed some contradictory findings. For instance the study found 
that staff thought that working relationships were improving but morale remained 
variable. Our focus groups corroborated these findings.  
 
Turning to staff views about the fairness of their pay, in every trust where we 
conducted focus groups, staff voiced dissatisfaction with their pay levels (rather than 
the pay system per se) and compared their position with professions inside and 
outside the NHS.  For instance at Acute Teaching 3 nursing staff compared their pay 
unfavourably with teachers and the police as well as those in private sector industries. 
Theatre staff at Multiservice 3 made comments such as ‘You shouldn’t have to be a 
manager to earn a reasonable salary’ whilst laboratory staff, in particular were of the 
view that they were inequitably rewarded both absolutely and compared to colleagues 
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in nursing, radiography and physiotherapy. Indeed one MLSO said that although she 
had worked for many years in the NHS, her daughter, a nurse, was earning more than 
her.  
 
Staff, however, did not suggest that differences in terms and conditions between 
occupational groups affected their commitment. Moreover, a union representative in 
another trust which had not harmonised commented that she did not believe that her 
members were aware of the terms and conditions of colleagues in other occupational 
groups and that such differences did not hinder staff from working together. As a 
nurse at Multiservice 1 said: 
 
Every day you get on with your multi-disciplinary team. You have to get on with them and 
communicate with them, regardless of whether you’re getting paid a penny or a pound because 
you are all there because of the patient and you are there to work together at the end of the day. 
That’s why I think most nurses are in the nursing profession. The money’s not great but it’s the 
profession you choose that you love and enjoy. 
 
As mentioned, trusts have been required to conduct annual staff attitude surveys from 
1999 (see sub-section 2.3.6). We were provided with such surveys for five out of our 
10 trusts. They all indicated that pay and benefits attracted adverse ratings.  It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that dissatisfaction with pay may reflect more 
general concerns about pay levels rather than pay systems as such and the latter, not 
the former, is the focus of this study.  Furthermore, the results were from all staff, not 
solely from those on trust pay. 
 
Finally, our focus groups at Acute Teaching 2 and Community, where the pay rates 
were inclusive of unsocial hours premia, revealed that staff valued the stability in 
earnings. Moreover, we were told by a manager at Very Large Acute 2, where there 
were inclusive rates also, that staff there welcomed the stability in earnings which the 
system provided.  They also liked the lump sum bonus.   
2.3.7.7 Union views 
 
We now concentrate on outcome from the unions’ point of view. The unions had a 
strong belief in the principle of equity. In all our case study trusts, the unions 
considered that their members were inequitably rewarded compared to their 
responsibilities and the pay enjoyed by those not in the NHS.  This view was held 
regardless of whether their members were on a trust pay system or on the national 
arrangements. 
2.3.7.7.1  General 
 
Turning to pay systems, rather than pay levels, however, where a trust had its own pay 
regime, unions favoured systems based on the national pay points, albeit with pay 
progression arrangements altered, rather than pay rates based on new grading 
structures. They also favoured pay arrangements which resulted in greater equity 
between different occupational groups, as they did in respect of theatre staff at Acute 
Teaching 2 and Multiservice 2, or where staff were on a single pay spine as at 
Community and Very Large Acute 2.  
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2.3.7.7.2  Performance pay 
 
The unions’ main concern on the grounds of equity and their bone of contention with 
management was performance related pay, especially where fine distinctions between 
employees were made and/or a significant proportion of employees did not get a 
performance related increase. For instance a union representative at Very Large Acute 
2 said categorically some six years after the introduction of a new pay system: ‘we 
don’t agree with the performance pay bonus’. A union representative at Urban 1 said: 
that the original performance related pay scheme ‘was very much behavioural…very 
subjective’ and was working with management to replace it with a new, less 
subjective, rating system. A union representative at Multiservice 1 said: ‘the way I see 
it, the pay system is that it’s human nature. If your face fits you do well.’ Indeed, the 
unions were pleased where they had managed to ‘water down’ performance related 
pay. A union representative at Community said: 
 
It’s a performance review in a way but we’ve taken the sting out of that… We’ve turned it 
round and said you know, it’s only in exceptional circumstances, if somebody’s really so 
awful that they’re not going to get it, so we’ve actually sort of changed the focus. 
 
The unions were also more inclined to favour a system where only one performance 
increment a year could be awarded, as at Acute Teaching 2, or as in practice occurred 
at Acute Teaching 3 and Multiservice 2. In addition, the unions preferred the term 
‘competency based pay system’ rather than ‘performance based pay system’.  A union 
representative remarked, ‘performance related pay has got connotations …the bells 
start to ring’. 
 
Whether or not a competency or performance based pay system was used, however, 
the unions voiced concern over managers’ assessment capabilities. The comment by a 
union representative at Acute Teaching 3 was not untypical: 
 
Competencies, when they work, work well, having a set of standards for all grades 
irrespective if they’re in a clinical area… the equity of the measure, the opportunity to 
measure candidates against what is fundamental, that is good but the negative aspect of that is 
that if the appraisal system isn’t working effectively, then those competencies aren’t 
benchmarked effectively and they can be used in a negative manner. 
 
2.3.7.7.3  Remuneration 
 
The unions were more likely to favour a new pay system where it led to increased 
remuneration for their members without distinctions made between them by 
management. More money had resulted from new pay arrangements for theatre staff 
at Multiservice 2. At Urban 1 the unions pointed out that although members obtained 
more money initially when they transferred to the new pay system for nurses and 
midwives, the bars and forced distribution of the performance pay system meant that 
in later years only a few reaped significant monetary rewards. Similarly at Acute 
Teaching 3 a union representative commented that the bars in the pay bands limited 
members’ monetary reward. 
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2.3.7.7.4  Partnership 
 
In no trust did we receive the impression that management/union relationships were 
deteriorating. On the contrary a new partnership forum had been set up at 
Multiservice 3 and was in the throes of being set up at Acute Teaching 3. At Very 
Large Acute 1 management and unions were working closely together to revise the 
performance pay system. At Large Acute closer management/union relationships had 
emerged when, according to the unions, a manager left. At Very Large Acute 2 the 
unions suggested that they now had more of a partnership with management. These 
developments boded well for the future. 
2.3.8 Summary 
This section has reported our findings. Management aims could be categorised as 
value driven or issues driven. A values based approach was found where trusts were 
proposing to introduce pay changes for a significant proportion of the workforce 
throughout the organisation, while an issues based approach was found where trusts 
were proposing to introduce pay changes for a discrete area only. 
 
The extent to which employees were eligible for trust pay systems varied considerably 
as did take-up rates. As to new grading systems, half of our trusts used some form of 
job evaluation, with Medequate being the most common and three trusts adopted 
single pay spines. Only one trust introduced a very broad banded structure, with no 
pay maxima to grades and most trusts which introduced their own pay systems ended 
up with grading structures very little different from the national grading structures. 
Basic pay apart, there was harmonisation of conditions, particularly working hours at 
37.5 hours a week, unsocial hours, overtime premia and on-call payments. Annual 
leave was the least likely of all the major terms and conditions to be harmonised.  
 
Where trusts introduced new pay systems they all introduced some form of 
performance/competency payment and, in all except one trust, this was based on the 
individual, not the organisation. There was, however, a wide variation in the extent 
that trusts made distinctions between employees’ performance. In one trust there were 
10 levels of performance payment, while in contrast in two others, where employees 
received an annual increment if performance was satisfactory, we found no evidence 
that such an increment had ever been withheld. 
 
The unions did not favour any departure from the national pay arrangements. Given 
that principled stance there were essentially three pragmatic approaches: 
management/union agreement; discussions between management and unions prior to 
the introduction of a new pay system, but not agreement and then subsequently 
negotiations and agreement on the annual increase; no discussions prior to the 
implementation of the pay system but subsequently negotiations and agreement on the 
annual increase. 
 
Management time in developing a pay system was hard to quantify, especially where 
staff incorporated pay development and implementation into their other duties. 
Assimilation costs varied between nil and 3.5% of the paybill and in some trusts were 
absorbed by departments. Evaluation was limited and where it took place it was often 
small in scale, eg a pilot, and the data collected by trusts, for instance on labour 
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turnover, sickness, exit interviews, did not distinguish between those on Whitley 
contracts and those on trust contracts and was often insufficiently comprehensive 
longitudinally.  
 
As to outcomes, these are summarised in respect of our second research question on 
the consequences of local pay;  (see sub-section 2.4.2 below). 
 
2.4 Discussion and conclusions 
We now return to our four research questions which we address in turn. 
2.4.1 Research question one 
Did local pay resolve the problems associated with Whitley? 
 
Our literature review indicated that the Whitley system was criticised on four main 
grounds connected with its structure, complexity, lack of local flexibility and equal 
value problems (see section 1.4).  
2.4.1.1 Structure 
 
The current  (January 2001) Whitley Council structure is set out in sub-section 1.4.2. 
In summary there is a General Whitley Council with numerous functional councils 
and committees. There are over 20 recognised unions, many employer 
representatives, plus civil servants. Our data based on 10 case study trusts showed that 
where there were innovations in pay and grading, the structure was greatly simplified. 
On the management side, there was only one employer, ie the trust. On the union side 
the number of unions active in the trust varied, but was considerably less than the 
number recognised nationally. For instance, Very Large Acute 2 recognised nine 
unions, ie all unions with more than 30 members in the trust and Large Acute 
recognised seven unions. Acute Teaching 3 recognised 13 unions but had a smaller 
negotiating group with only six staff side representatives. 
 
Over 25 years ago, McCarthy (1976) recommended that civil servants should have 
control over the overall cost of pay offers but that the detail of NHS pay structures 
should be left to NHS managers (see sub-section 1.4.3). From 1991, some trusts 
introduced their own pay systems, with managers designing their pay structures but 
civil servants continued to control the overall cost of the paybill in two ways. First, 
virtually all the income obtained by trusts comes from the Department of Health, 
albeit often indirectly. Second, because the law provides that some NHS staff can 
choose to remain under Whitley, settlements were in practice in line with the 
settlements agreed nationally and, in particular, the awards stemming from the pay 
review body for nurses and PAMs which are dependant on acceptance by the 
Secretary of State. In short, some trusts achieved simplification, whilst remaining 
under a national umbrella of cost control.  
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2.4.1.2 Complexity  
 
Another problem identified by managers (Warlow, 1989) was the complexity of the 
numerous, diverse agreements under Whitley (see sub-section 1.4.4). In fact collective 
agreements were made simpler in a number of trusts. Community and Very Large 
Acute 2 introduced single pay spines for all except those at board level and non-
medical staff and terms and conditions, except for annual leave, were harmonised. 
Acute Teaching 1 also introduced a single pay spine though the number of 
occupational categories excluded (eg pharmacists, estates offices and scientists) was 
greater than in the other two trusts. At Acute Teaching 2, Acute Teaching 3, 
Multiservice 2, Very Large Acute 1, there was simplification in theatres where 
ODAs/ODPs and theatre nurses were put on common terms and conditions, instead of 
being governed by two different Whitley Councils. 
 
In contrast to the move by some trusts towards simplicity, there was greater 
complexity in other trusts. The prime example was Very Large Acute 1 where there 
were a variety of trust terms and conditions for many different groups of staff: at 
Urban 1 for nurses, midwives, nursery nurses and support workers; administrative and 
clerical staff; hotel services staff; professional staff and theatre staff and at Urban 2 
for medical secretaries and staff in Trauma & Orthopaedics and Accident & 
Emergency. The merger between Urban 1 and Urban 2 in April 1998 further 
complicated this with new staff being put on the merged trust’s contract which 
essentially mirrored Whitley. At the time of our research, work was being undertaken 
to reduce the complexities of different pay systems within the trust.  
 
Another example of an increase in complexity was Large Acute. That trust, eschewing 
an organisation-wide strategic approach, introduced new terms and conditions for 
maintenance craftsmen, ancillary staff in the central sterile services department, 
clinical support workers and midwives, each group having different arrangements 
aimed at resolving particular problems. Even where the trust adopted an organisation-
wide approach, however, the resulting pay system did not always lead to 
simplification. For instance, at Multiservice 1 the new pay system, which introduced 
eight separate recruitment clusters, abolished increments and had no set pay points 
above the minima, was not simple. 
 
Pay structures apart, another source of complexity was the pay progression 
arrangements. Under Whitley pay progression is based on increments dependant on 
length of service. Such arrangements are simple and easy for staff to understand (and 
for finance directors to predict paybill costs). All the trusts which had replaced 
national pay structures, however, had introduced at least an element of performance 
based pay. Probably the most complex performance based pay progression system 
was in Urban 1 in respect of nurses and midwives, see sub-section 2.3.3.4, but in 
every trust union representatives found the performance/competency based 
arrangements opaque, even though some in theory favoured competency based pay. 
2.4.1.3 Centralisation 
 
The third critique by managers centred round what they saw as too much 
centralisation (Warlow, 1989). This militated against the flexibility which managers 
said they wanted. From 1991 trusts, by introducing their own pay systems, could 
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obviate this; but we have seen that one of our case study trusts did not depart from 
Whitley at all and in only three trusts were the majority of employees covered by pay 
arrangements which materially differed from the national arrangements; see figure 
2.1. A number of reasons why so few trusts seized the opportunity to decentralise 
have been identified in the literature, including the continuance of national pay 
arrangements (Carter and Fairbrother, 1999), institutional obstacles (Locock and 
Dopson, 1999) and the more immediate priorities of pragmatic HR directors (Corby 
and Higham, 1996); see sub-section 1.4.8 for details.  
2.4.1.4 Equal value 
 
Problems relating to equal pay for work of equal value have come to the fore as a 
result of the Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority (1993) litigation. The European 
Court of Justice held that NHS employers are required by law objectively to justify 
differences in pay between male dominated occupational groups and female 
dominated occupational groups (see sub-section 1.4.6). A factor based job evaluation 
scheme can provide objective justification and our data show that four of our 10 trusts 
used a factor based job evaluation scheme (Medequate) for most non-medical 
occupational groups and one trust used a competency based factor scheme. It has not 
yet been tested, however, whether or not the ruling in Scullard v Knowles (1996) and 
South Ayrshire Council v Morton (2001) apply to employees in the NHS, ie whether 
an employee can compare herself for the purposes of an equal value claim with a 
colleague employed in another NHS trust. 
2.4.2 Research question two 
What were the consequences of local pay? 
 
Sub-section 2.3.7 on outcomes gives full details of our findings which were subsumed 
in this research question. In summary, we found no positive or negative relationship 
between new pay systems and labour turnover, though given the deficiencies in the 
data for the purposes of this study, such findings were not surprising. Similarly, we 
did not find any positive or negative relationship between pay systems and NHS 
performance indicators. Our qualitative data, however, revealed that many 
management interviewees and some staff, were of the view that their new pay 
systems, all of which emphasised performance/competency, had led to an 
improvement in patient care, though it was generally admitted that this was hard to 
quantify. Also, our case study data revealed many examples of new pay systems 
indirectly affecting patient care where they underpinned temporal flexibility: new on-
call arrangements, rotating shifts and annual hours (see sub-section 2.3.7). 
Interestingly, however, while most managers were strongly of the view that 
harmonisation supported teamworking across occupational boundaries, a minority of 
managers and most staff were of the view that teamworking took place irrespective of 
whether terms and conditions were harmonised. 
 
We also found that new pay systems indirectly affected patient care where they 
underpinned functional flexibility. The most common example of multi-skilling was 
in theatres between ODAs/ODPs and theatre nurses. Of the nine trusts which had 
theatres, six were carrying out such multi-skilling and, in managers’ views, the 
consequence was that they were better able to tailor their work to service needs. 
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There were also some negative consequences. Foremost among these was union 
hostility. As discussed in sub-section 2.3.7.7, the unions were opposed in principle to 
local pay and, for instance, at one trust the unions refused to enter into discussions 
with management even on a ‘need to know’ basis. Second, the proliferation of diverse 
pay systems reinforced labour market competition at a time of growing scarcity in 
many NHS occupations. Third, our focus group data indicated that at least some staff 
were dissatisfied with the trust’s new pay arrangements, particularly where a 
comprehensive but opaque system of performance related pay had been introduced. 
Fourth, the development of a trust pay system was less resource efficient than national 
pay determination as there was a need to ‘reinvent the wheel’. To take an example: in 
five of our case study trusts there was harmonisation of working hours at 37.5 per 
week, at least among some occupational groups, but in each of these trusts there were 
discussions with the unions. Harmonisation at national level would perhaps have been 
more time efficient. 
2.4.3 Research question three 
Our third research question was as follows: 
 
Were the trusts’ pay systems introduced in line with 'new pay' ideas and current 
trends in reward management? 
 
We address this question using the areas outlined in section 1.5 of our literature 
review: pay strategies, variable pay, grading structures, harmonisation and variable 
hours.  
2.4.3.1 Pay strategies 
 
We begin by considering whether trusts adopted a strategic approach, as 
recommended by Lawler (1990; 1995), Mahoney (1989) and Schuster and Zingheim 
(1992). Our data revealed that only in four trusts was a strategic, organisation-wide 
approach taken. Three trusts initially planned to take an organisation-wide approach 
but in the event did not do so. We also considered whether those trusts which adopted 
a strategic approach, formulated their strategy on a contingency or best practice basis. 
Given that there was a coincidence in the aims espoused, eg simplicity, flexibility and 
performance management, our data suggested that a best practice approach was taken. 
Accordingly, our findings contrast with those of Kessler and Purcell (1996). As all the 
trusts were in the same ‘business’, healthcare in England, however, there was perhaps 
little scope for contingent differentiation.  
2.4.3.2 Variable pay 
 
The 'new pay' and reward management writers recommend the individualisation of 
pay, for instance by performance related pay in place of the rate for the job, and we 
found that our case study trusts were no exception to the finding of a growth in the 
use of performance related pay by British employers (Cannell and Wood, 1992): nine 
out of our 10 trusts introduced at least an element of performance pay. Notably, the 
rhetoric of performance pay was not always translated into reality. In two trusts, 
where performance pay was based on annual increments, there was no evidence of 
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such an increment ever being withheld from an employee. Only in one trust was the 
entire annual pay award determined by performance and there were no incremental 
points. In all the other trusts, there was a separate annual review and no indication that 
trusts had adopted the views of the Conservative government that the annual pay 
round be 'dethroned'; see sub-section 1.2.1.  
 
Interestingly, our data revealed that trusts’ performance pay systems made fine 
distinctions between employees where they had been introduced in the first half of the 
1990s. (For instance one trust distinguished the performance of employees in 10 
bandings.) In contrast, we found no examples of trusts which introduced their 
performance pay systems after 1996 making such fine distinctions. 
 
 
Our literature review indicated that studies in the UK and USA, in both the public and 
private sectors, without exception revealed major problems in operationalising merit 
pay and considerable evidence of negative effects upon employee motivation, see sub-
section 1.5.4. Our data from the focus groups, which we held with staff, essentially 
supported these findings, especially where there was a performance pay system which 
made fine distinctions between staff. (For further details see sub-section 2.3.7.6).  
 
Only in one trust in respect of nurses and midwives was a specific analysis undertaken 
in respect of the effect of performance pay on equal opportunities. This analysis 
revealed no bias in respect of gender or ethnicity. This contrasted with the study of 
Bevan and Thompson (1992) who looked at four organisations in the public and 
private sectors and found gender bias. It also contrasted with a study of performance 
pay in the civil service (Civil Service College, 1995), which found bias on grounds of 
ethnicity. 
  
Although Kessler (2000) outlines the perceived advantages of skills or competency 
based progression over traditional output or target related performance pay, the 
Industrial Society (1998) found little evidence of its use. In contrast, we found what 
was termed competency based pay in four trusts. Staff in our focus groups were 
generally positive about the principle of competency based pay, but some of their 
comments echoed the critiques identified by Sparrow (1996), ie developing 
competencies is complex and uncertain and existing appraisal techniques may not be 
sufficiently robust. Also, our data suggested that trusts found it more straightforward 
to develop competencies based on skills, than on more abstract behavioural attributes. 
The latter were often evaluated by means of employee portfolios or profiles which 
could be problematic. We also found, as did Thompson (1995), virtually no evidence 
of team based performance pay. 
2.4.3.3 Grading structures 
 
Our data relating to the use of job evaluation to underpin grading structures contrasted 
with the views of American 'new pay' writers that job evaluation is in decline. Rather 
our data accorded with considerable evidence in the UK that the reverse was the case; 
(see sub-section 1.5.5). Five of out of our nine trusts which introduced their own pay 
systems used job evaluation for some or all of their staff. This potentially provides an 
equal value defence and it can, if the job evaluation system is perceived as fair, 
(which it was not by a number of staff sides in our case studies), help to ensure that 
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employees perceive that they are rewarded fairly in comparison with others. In respect 
of banding within grading structures, we found only limited evidence of broad 
banding, see figure 2.2. Again this was consonant with a British study (Industrial 
Society, 1997). 
 
An area where our data accorded with current trends in reward management was the 
use of harmonisation. The latest WERS survey (Millward et al, 2000) indicated that 
there has been a shift to single table arrangements and a reduction in bargaining units; 
(see sub-section 1.5.6). Our data revealed single spines in three trusts. We also found 
harmonisation of terms and conditions apart from pay; (see table 2.5).  
2.4.3.4 Variable hours 
 
Another area where our findings accorded with current trends in reward management 
was in respect of pay which was kept constant for the employee, although there was 
variability in the timing, or amount of, the weekly hours worked. The relationship 
between pay and hours is particularly salient in NHS trusts as they are open seven 
days a week, 24 hours a day. There were essentially three new main ways in which 
trusts related pay to hours: first, three trusts had introduced an annual salary 
calculated inclusive of unsocial hours premia, with three or four rates depending on 
the unsocial hours worked; second, in one trust on-call payments were consolidated 
and an annual sum divided equally among rota members; and third, in another trust an 
annual hours system was introduced for maintenance staff. We found that employers 
introduced such schemes to control costs and to match hours to service needs, ie akin 
to the reasons found by Russell (1998), who looked at a range of industries and 
services. 
2.4.4 Research question four 
Our fourth research question is: 
 
What factors were critical to the success of developing and implementing 'new pay' 
systems in NHS trusts? 
 
Essentially, as outlined by Grimshaw (2000), pay and grading systems are the product 
of a complex interplay of tensions. These include notions of equity, custom and 
practice, industrial relations traditions, the external labour market, the technology 
involved and perceived performance management needs. Bearing in mind these 
complexities, our data revealed a number of critical success factors. First, a close 
working relationship between management and the staff side was identified by both 
management and union interviewees to be important in ensuring that arrangements 
were introduced relatively smoothly. Allied to this, the unions were of the view that 
union confidence in the trust’s project manager was essential if there was to be a 
smooth introduction of new pay arrangements. One of the union representatives 
whom we interviewed suggested that a trust-level project manager post should be job 
shared by a manager and a staff representative. As noted in sub-section 1.3.3, one of 
the reasons for the slow progress in implementing the 1997 local government 
agreement was the number of industrial disputes in local councils (IRS, 2000:6).  
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Second, communication with staff and staff involvement were seen by interviewees to 
be critical to success. This took a number of forms: for instance at one trust a manager 
and a union representative jointly saw each member of staff individually to explain 
how the new pay system would affect the individual and at another trust staff were 
involved, through focus groups, in determining the competencies required. 
 
Third, we became aware that the introduction of new pay arrangements were 
exceedingly time consuming and more time consuming than managers in many trusts 
had anticipated, especially if the introduction of the new pay system went hand in 
hand with the development of competencies. Indeed, in one trust the development and 
roll-out of a pay system took six years. It almost goes without saying that HR 
managers and line managers have other demands on their time. As noted above in 
sub-section 1.3.3, two city councils had established units dedicated to the 
implementation of the 1997 local government agreement and our data revealed that 
three trusts created new project manager posts. Interestingly, in trusts where new pay 
arrangements were introduced relatively speedily, there was strong board level 
commitment.  
 
Fourth, staff and union representatives were more likely to have confidence in pay 
systems if they were transparent. The way decisions on the performance award at 
some trusts were reached was not clear to staff (or to the researchers) and was 
criticised by staff representatives. 
 
Fifth, we became aware that harmonisation between occupational groups could 
provide a catalyst for teamwork. The prime example were theatres where the different 
Whitley terms and conditions for ODAs/ODPs and nurses were seen as counter-
productive to efficient working, with the result that theatres became a priority for new 
pay arrangements. Moreover, three trusts took harmonisation much further with the 
establishment of single pay spines. Such single status was largely welcomed by 
management, unions and staff on grounds of equity. Indeed, the HR director at a trust 
which had a single spine, expressed concern about the proposal under Agenda for 
Change to introduce three pay spines. We would add, however, that in areas where 
terms and conditions were not harmonised managers and staff were nevertheless of 
the view that various occupational groups worked together and we concluded that 
there were differences of degree in the level of teamwork, rather than of kind. 
 
Sixth, we found that trusts had often subsumed unsocial hours premia into basic pay 
in exchange for flexible rostering. We found that employees liked the stability of 
earnings which this produced and there were advantages for management, for instance 
in being able to predict paybill costs, though it could lead to inflexibilities (see sub-
section 2.3.7.2). 
 
Perhaps the most important message of all, however, was that pay systems could not 
be seen in isolation and were only a part of the HR agenda. Other factors were 
important, particularly career progression arrangements and pay levels. Virtually all 
the staff in the focus groups which we held in seven trusts (see table 2.3) voiced their 
appreciation of any training and development opportunities open to them and voiced 
dissatisfaction with their pay, comparing their position with professions inside and/or 
outside the NHS.  
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2.4.5 Final comment 
This report covers the pay and grading innovations introduced by trusts from the early 
1990s to 2000. It has shed light on the development and implementation of trust pay 
structures, looking in particular at approaches to grading and pay progression, and 
also examining process, costs and outcomes.  At the time of writing management and 
unions are negotiating a new pay and grading system, stemming from the proposals 
outlined in Agenda for Change (Department of Health, 1999), which will result in an 
agreement to apply to NHS employees nationally. The next phase of our research, 
which again will result in a report, will evaluate the implementation of this agreement. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
A & C Administrative and clerical staff 
A & E Accident and Emergency 
APT&C Administrative, professional, technical and clerical staff 
ATO Assistant technical officer 
BPR Business process re-engineering 
CPP Continuous process pattern 
CSSD Central Sterile Services Department 
CSW Clinical support worker 
DfEE Department for Education and Employment 
DOH Department of Health 
EAT Employment Appeal Tribunal 
ENB English National Board for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting 
ESOP Employee share ownership plan 
GNVQ General National Vocational Qualification 
HCA Health care assistant 
HR Human resources 
IDS Incomes Data Services 
IiP Investors in People 
IPD Institute for Personnel Development; now Chartered Institute for Personnel and 
Development 
IPDR Individual performance and development review 
IPR Individual performance review 
IPRP Individual performance related pay 
IRS Industrial Relations Services 
JE Job evaluation 
LSE London School of Economics 
MBA Master of Business Administration 
MLSA Medical laboratory scientific assistant 
MLSO Medical laboratory scientific officer 
MSF Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union  
MSR Management staff review 
MTO Medical technical officer 
N/A Not applicable 
NATFHE National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education 
NHS National Health Service 
NJC National Joint Council 
NVQ National Vocational Qualification 
ODA Operating department assistant 
ODP Operating department practitioner 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
PAM Professions allied to medicine 
PDR Performance development review 
PFC Patient focused care 
PRB Pay review body 
PRP Performance related pay 
PTA Professional and technical A (Whitley Council) 
PTB Professional and technical B (Whitley Council) 
RCM Royal College of Midwives 
RCN Royal College of Nursing 
SALT Speech and language therapist 
SoR Society of Radiographers 
T & O Trauma and Orthopaedics 
TUPE Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 
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UK United Kingdom 
USA United States of America 
WERS Workplace employee relations survey 
WIRS Workplace industrial relations survey 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Our original research questions, as outlined in our proposal (December 1999) were 
reformulated to take account of our literature review and absorb our earlier questions.  Our 
revised research questions were as follows: 
 
• Did local pay resolve the problems associated with Whitley? 
 
• What were the consequences of local pay? 
 
• Were the trusts’ pay systems introduced in line with 'new pay' ideas and current trends in 
reward management? 
 
• What factors were critical to the success of developing and implementing new pay 
systems in NHS trusts?  
 
Our original proposal listed the following research questions: 
 
1. What, if any, changes in working practices have taken place since the trust was 
established, in particular in respect of task flexibility and temporal flexibility? 
 
2. Are these changes in working practices related to changes in pay and, if so, how? 
 
3. When harmonising conditions of service what are the optimum arrangements? 
 
4. Where changes in pay and grading have taken place, what management and union 
resources were needed? 
 
5. How have trusts evaluated the costs/benefits of their pay and grading arrangements? 
 
6. Is the pay regime felt to be fair by staff? 
 
7. Has a partnership approach by management/unions been adopted in decisions on pay, 
grading and working practices? 
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